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
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INSTALLATION LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Orville N. Butts, MP  
Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Whitmarsh, I



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE

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20. ABSTRACT (Continued)

uments and procedures. The civilianization of military police spaces on US Army installations will reduce combat readiness and will impact adversely on the total Army law enforcement effort. Military police mobilization planning needs greater attention and emphasis at all levels. Post-mobilization planning for military police support at mobilization stations can be accomplished systematically. Consequently, the Army must insure that the necessary military police force structure is maintained to provide for the performance of installation-oriented military police functions during peacetime, while at the same time insuring that the appropriate mobilization planning is accomplished to meet wartime contingencies overseas and at CONUS mobilization installations.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

INSTALLATION LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Orville N. Butts, MP  
Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Whitmarsh, MP

Colonel Joseph J. Skaff, FA  
Study Adviser

Approved for public release;  
distribution unlimited.

US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
May 1978

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# ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR(S):** Orville N. Butts, LTC, MP  
Donald B. Whitmarsh, LTC, MP  
**Adviser:** Joseph J. Skaff, COL, ADA

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Several important issues have developed in recent years which require an evaluation of military police functions, an analysis of installation military police force structures, and military police mobilization planning. Most military police functions as presently performed are valid, and support the total Army Goals. They will require performance into the future by personnel trained to accomplish the varied technical aspects of each function. Military police units which provide support at US Army installations can and should be structured as TOE units through using existing force planning documents and procedures. The civilianization of military police spaces on US Army installations will reduce combat readiness and will impact adversely on the total Army law enforcement effort. Military police mobilization planning needs greater attention and emphasis at all levels. Post-mobilization planning for military police support at mobilization stations can be accomplished systematically. Consequently, the Army must insure that the necessary military police force structure is maintained to provide for the performance of installation-oriented military police functions during peacetime, while at the same time insuring that the appropriate mobilization planning is accomplished to meet wartime contingencies overseas and at CONUS mobilization installations.

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## PREFACE

This group study project was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. The scope of the project was proposed by the Chief, Law Enforcement Division, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army. The method of investigation was devised by the authors. The subject areas studied were proposed because of a significant need to address problems facing military police force planners and action officers at the DA and Major Command levels. The primary thrust of the authors is twofold. First, to evaluate and analyze key issues; and, second, to develop some answers for use by action officers.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Providing good military police support to the Army is the goal of the men and women of the Military Police Corps. This means being ready to provide combat and combat service support during peace and war, here at home and at some far distant location on very short notice. This study is dedicated to insuring that this attitude is allowed to continue into the future.

### PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to address several facets of military police activities as they pertain to the nature of installation law enforcement. Specifically, an evaluation of military police functions is made, the General Support Force (GSF) military police force structure is analyzed, and mobilization force planning is discussed.

### BACKGROUND

This study was undertaken upon request from the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division, DCSPER, Headquarters Department of the Army. The primary goal is to provide some indepth study into areas that have significant impact on the structure and viability of the military police and the functions they perform.



### SCOPE

The information presented in this study is applicable to all planning problems relating to military police functional statements, to GSF and STRAF force structuring, and to post-mobilization military police support determinations.

### SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of this study is derived from its potential contributions to the updating of function-oriented Army Regulations, to the force structuring of GSF military police units, and to more realistic post-mobilization military police planning. The results of this study will be forwarded to the requesting office for use in responding to the myriad of actions that develop in the three areas discussed above.

### METHODOLOGY

This study, because of its threefold purpose, involves analytical and evaluative actions mixed with some developmental efforts. It required an extensive literature review of various published documents, action papers, and studies. Personal interviews were conducted with members of the DA, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and MILPERCEN staffs and with several members of the US Army Military Police School. Survey questionnaires (Appendix A) were sent to 18 senior installation provost marshals. A summary of their comments is also included in



the appendix. Because of the nature of the study, frequent reliance is made on personal analysis and experience.

#### ORGANIZATION

This study is organized into five chapters and one appendix. Chapter I provides the basic information on which the study stands. Chapter II addresses an evaluation of military police functions. Chapter III discusses many facets of the GSF military police force structure. Chapter IV discusses some major mobilization planning issues and presents a method for determining post-mobilization military police requirements. Chapter V closes the paper with a summary and some conclusions.

## CHAPTER II

### MILITARY POLICE FUNCTION EVALUATION

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an evaluation of functions that are, or should be, performed by military police elements or personnel. The evaluation includes determining whether or not the functions in either category support the total Army goals, evaluating the viability of each function through the 1985 time frame, and discussing the level of military police involvement in the performance of the function. The scope of this evaluation includes the following categories of functions.

1. Those major functions which are assigned to military police units and personnel by Army Regulation.
2. Those functions that are performed by military police personnel, but which are not, or should not be, the sole responsibility of the military police.
3. Those functions that require more emphasis and visibility because of changing problem areas.
4. Those functions that should be eliminated.

#### INFORMATION SOURCES

The functional statements used for this evaluation came from several sources.

1. Army Regulations.
2. Doctrinal publications.

3. Military police MTOE.
4. Military police manpower surveys.
5. Questionnaires administered to several senior Army installation provost marshals.
6. Interviews and discussions with military police staff officers.
7. From the personal experience of the authors.

#### METHODOLOGY

To evaluate each major military police function in terms of the purpose of this study, it was necessary to divide each primary and secondary function, as obtained from the sources indicated above, into all of the subfunctions. Once this was accomplished, each subfunction was then put through the decision model (Figure 2-1) for the purpose of evaluation. This was necessary because it was possible that the major function taken in its entirety would flow through the decision model without any determination as to the appropriateness of a subfunction. Those subfunctions that did not flow through the model because of questions at any of the major decision points were extracted for further discussion and included in the discussions presented in the following paragraphs.




Figure 2-1

DCSPER SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES

AR 10-5 assigns responsibilities to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that have direct relationship within the functions performed by, and assigned to, military police units and personnel.

Extracts from the regulation are as follows:

2-26. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.  
The . . . DCSPER on behalf of the Secretary of the Army acts as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for the administration of the DOD Enemy PW/Detainee Program. . . .

a. He has General Staff responsibility for--

. . . . .

(8) Discipline, law enforcement,  
correction/confinement, and crime prevention.

. . . . .

(11) Alcohol and drug abuse prevention  
and control.

. . . . .

(36) War crimes.

(37) Absenteeism.

(38) Army crime reporting, including  
proponent for the Serious Incident Reporting  
System.

(39) Physical security.

(40) Criminal investigations.

b. He exercises General Staff responsibilities for the DOD Enemy PW/Detainee Program and is designated the single point of contact within the Army relative to enemy PW/Detainee matters. Specific responsibilities include--



(1) Development and coordination of policies, plans, and programs, and management of related activities pertaining to enemy PW, civilian internees, or other detainees.

(2) Providing DA Staff supervision over the United States Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Information Center.

(3) Providing necessary reports, coordination, technical advice, and appropriate staff assistance to the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(4) Coordinating with appropriate Government agencies or their components regarding related activities in the general fields of foreign policy, international politico-military affairs, national treaty commitments, force requirements, accountability systems, unit training, and other areas which impact on the administration of the DOD Enemy PW/Detainee Program.

b. He is . . . .<sup>1</sup>

With regard to subparagraph (8), the word "discipline" is included not as a basic responsibility of the military police, but as a function that the military police have a significant part to play when assisting commanders in the maintenance of discipline.

Subparagraphs a (11), (36), and (37) are areas where the military police perform in a "support" role in enforcing the regulatory aspects of the particular function within the overall personnel management system.



### MILITARY POLICE CORPS FUNCTIONS

The basic Army Regulation that specifies the functions of the Military Police Corps, interpreted to mean units and personnel, is AR 10-6.<sup>2</sup> This particular regulation identifies the branches of the Army and enumerates the "functions and duties" performed by their members. Other military police and criminal investigation-oriented regulations in the 190 and 195 series further delineate the functions prescribed in AR 10-6. Eleven military police doctrinal manuals in the 19 series and one in the 31 series on military police operations expand on the generalized Army Regulation statements and further define subfunctions. Manpower survey documents and MTOE specify, in detail, those functions and duties that a particular unit and its assigned personnel accomplish. Other functions and duties not delineated in regulatory, doctrinal, or organizational documents that military police personnel find themselves accomplishing were obtained through questionnaires sent to senior provost marshals and from personal experience of the authors.

One of the more difficult tasks in selecting the various missions and functions for analysis, beyond those specified in the regulatory documents, centers around the level of resolution desired. The selection of broad missions and functions only, of course, is the least difficult and can be handled in general terms. In the other extreme, that of selecting specific subfunctions down to the lowest level of consideration would be counterproductive in the amount of detail required. Consequently, an attempt has been made

to select a level of resolution which will provide for meaningful functional analysis which may be helpful to those who use this study. Army Regulation 10-6 is used as the starting point. The other sources have been used to bring the level of resolution to a point where significant functions, some of which could be considered as subfunctions of those specified in Army Regulation 10-6, are considered and analyzed within the parameters of this study.

#### Section X. MILITARY POLICE CORPS

2-19. Scope. The Military Police Corps is a basic branch of the Army. It is a combat support arm and a service since the Military Police Corps performs combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. Personnel and units provide the expertise and means to control tactical areas of responsibility; prisoner of war, civilian internee, detainee, and other operations directed toward the protection of victims of war; police internal defense operations; crime prevention and investigation; circulation control of vehicles and personnel; physical security operations; operation of Army confinement and correctional training facilities, and industrial defense activities. Military police officers are assigned to branch material and branch immaterial positions within all Army, joint, and combined commands and staffs.

2-20. Functions and duties. Military police personnel and units perform primarily combat support and combat service support functions. To accomplish these functions, it is essential that Military Police officers possess a comprehensive knowledge of military operations and tactics. In addition, Military Police Corps officers are especially qualified through education, training, and experience for the following duties:

- a. Provide military police combat support in a theater of operation, to include--

(1) Circulation control of traffic and individuals.

(2) Security of lines of communication, installations, ports and harbors, facilities, and movements of critical or sensitive supplies and equipment.

(3) Administration and enforcement of activities in support of United States Government obligations and responsibilities under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and all other applicable humanitarian law for the protection of war victims.

(4) Enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations.

(5) Participation in those action programs in support of internal defense and stability operations.

(6) Prevention and investigation of crime.

(7) Collection, evaluation, and dissemination of police intelligence and information.

(8) Confinement and correctional treatment of military prisoners.

(9) Control of tactical areas of operations.

(10) Participation in rear area protection operations and the protection of urban areas.

b. Command organizational elements whose primary mission is the direct support of combat operations.

c. Command combat support and service support forces to include elements of other branches, other U.S. Armed services, allied police, paramilitary police or armed forces, or any combination thereof.

d. Command organizations and elements thereof whose primary mission is the maintenance of discipline, law and order, or the training of personnel and units to perform same.

e. Provide advice on the police aspects of internal defense operations.

f. Serve as the Army's experts on the employment of Military Police forces at all staff levels, furnishing advice to commanders and their staffs, and coordinating and planning the Military Police support of military operations.

g. Supervise and/or participate in the development of doctrine and organizations and in the design, testing, and selection of weapons and equipment to support the missions assigned to Military Police units.

h. Enforce military laws, orders, and regulations on Army and other Government installations, facilities, and transportation as directed; and among all persons subject to the UCMJ regardless of location.

i. Command correctional facilities such as installation confinement facilities, disciplinary barracks, and correctional training facilities, and provide supervision and expertise for correctional and rehabilitational treatment.

j. Support civil authorities and/or other military agencies during domestic disturbances and disasters.

k. Develop, supervise, and administer a coordinated prisoner of war, civilian internee and detainee program for the United States Government including programs and international informational systems related to missing and detained United States personnel.

l. Supervise the promulgation of the Department of Defense Industrial Defense Program.

m. Conduct security planning and operations for installations, facilities, sensitive materiel, and certain designated personnel.

n. Serve as commandant, and/or staff and faculty members of service schools primarily oriented toward police operations and at other schools as faculty members.

o. Instruct and advise Reserve and National Guard elements in military police matters.

p. Participate in special career programs including the Army Aviation Program.

q. Perform tasks associated with career planning, development, management, and assignment of Military Police Corps personnel.

r. Serve in both branch material and branch immaterial positions within all Army, joint and combined commands and staffs.

s. Administer motor vehicle traffic supervision programs including traffic control and circulation, accident prevention and investigation, and police services adjunct to motor vehicle administration.<sup>3</sup>

It can be noted by a review of the above extract that a clear delineation of functions to cover both the peacetime and wartime responsibilities of the military police is very difficult. Except for functions that are accomplished solely during wartime, i.e., handling prisoners of war, civilian internees, and detainees; control of tactical areas of responsibility; participation in rear area protection operations and the protection of urban areas; and participation in internal defense and stability operations; all other functions are accomplished during both peace and wartime. It should also be noted that several of the functions assigned to the Military Police Corps do not have a direct line to a general staff responsibility



of the DCSPER as delineated in the previous paragraph. General staff responsibility, except in very general terms in other general staff sections for military police-oriented functions, does not exist. For example, general staff responsibility for the very important functional area of rear area protection is not stated explicitly in AR 10-5. It could be included, by stretching the imagination, as a subfunction of the following extract from AR 10-5.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has the Army General Staff responsibility for strategy formulation, overall force development, and establishment of requirements and priorities for, and the utilization of, Army forces.<sup>4</sup>

No other functional statements are made which specify that there is any Army General Staff element that is specifically assigned any purview over what has been, and is becoming more so, one of the more important tactical considerations facing field commanders. This failure to specify clear-cut functional responsibility is another area unto itself, and falls outside the parameters of this study. Some additional comments relating to this problem will be made in later parts of this chapter. Additionally, a further analysis of the functional listing indicates some duplication of description with different, and sometimes confusing, wording. This part of the regulation needs to be rewritten to insure that a clear delineation of military police functions is made and that there is no room for confusion.



### Combat Support Functions

The functional evaluation made in the following paragraphs, as indicated earlier, is oriented toward commenting on the function in terms of supporting the total Army goals, on the performance of the function through 1985, and on the level of continued military police involvement in each functional area. The evaluation begins with the 10 functions listed in paragraph 2-20a of AR 10-6. Those functions listed in other subparagraphs of the regulation are discussed in the next paragraph.

Circulation control of traffic and individuals. This function is performed during peace and wartime. It includes all of those traditional activities having to do with the control of individuals and vehicles as they move about on a military installation (peacetime) and, additionally, on the battlefield (wartime). It is accomplished through the active use of personnel who give guidance and direction, and through the use of directives either in the form of regulations, maps, signs, or other written instructions.

1. Support to the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, materiel, and management goals of the Army. The performance of this function provides for efficient, safe, and controlled movement of personnel and materiel in support of military activities, whether they be on an installation during peacetime or on the battlefield during wartime.

2. Longevity. The performance of this function will be required throughout the Military Establishment through the 1985 time

period. It will require the participation of personnel and equipment together through the same time period. New items of equipment (traffic control devices, location indicators, etc.) may ultimately be substituted for some personnel, but operators will still be necessary. No significant doctrinal changes are anticipated which will alter the basic requirement for circulation control. Circulation control in the form known today will continue to be cost effective through 1985 because of the savings provided through the organization and efficiency that accrues to what would be somewhat chaotic and disorganized movements if the function was not performed.

3. Level of military police involvement. The nature of this function and the many included subfunctions coupled with the area-oriented deployment philosophy of the military police and their basic enforcement role, will cause this function to remain within the sole responsibility of military police units and individuals. One subfunction, that of vehicle registration, does not appear to be cost-effective in terms of the overall contribution to the Army's goals. It is discussed in detail below.

Security of lines of communication, installations, ports and harbors, facilities and movements of critical or sensitive personnel and equipment. The performance of this function is critical to successful combat operations during wartime, and to the security of personnel and materiel during peacetime. Without adequate security and protection for those things discussed in the functional statement, which provides an environment where the total resources required for

support of the fighting force can have a reasonable assurance of being where they are required at the right time, the combat efforts will collapse. This security is provided through the use of personnel and equipment to deny access to, or the interdiction of, by other than air interdiction, those installations, facilities, and lines of communication vital to the personnel and logistical support systems supporting the combat elements. No doctrinal changes in functional requirements are anticipated. The function may be absorbed as a subfunction of rear area protection operations as discussed below. Because of the importance of function to the continued existence of personnel and equipment assets required for combat operation, the cost effectiveness is obvious.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, materiel, management, and strategic deployment goals of the Army. The performance of this function provides for the continued existence of the necessary personnel and equipment to support the combat effort, and a reasonable assurance that most of the personnel and equipment will arrive at the required location in a usable condition. Through good security, the attrition levels of resources as they move from the point of origination to the point of use can be maintained at an acceptable level.

2. Longevity. The performance of this function will be required out through the 1985 time period. It will require the employment of personnel and equipment through the same period. The importance of the effective performance of this function will continue

to increase into the foreseeable future because of the continuing increase in equipment costs and the scarcity of trained personnel resources, thereby requiring higher levels of security.

3. Level of military police involvement. Security, in its most general sense, is the inherent responsibility of all units and individuals regardless of branch or MOS. On the other hand, specific responsibility for specialized security planning and operations, which is considered over and above that inherent responsibility discussed above, should fall to some group of personnel who have been given the necessary training to accomplish this additional specialized level of security. Because of the close relationship between law enforcement and security activities in terms of the protection of personnel and equipment, this function logically falls to the military police. Although exact figures are not available, it can be easily estimated that the performance of the security function requires more military police resources on most installations and on an Army-wide basis than any other function. Some senior military police commanders and provost marshals will indicate that providing security requires more resources than all of their other responsibilities put together.

Administration and enforcement of activities in support of United States Government obligations and responsibilities under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and all other applicable humanitarian law for the protection of war victims. The performance of this function relates to those activities of evacuating, processing,



securing, and interring of prisoners of war, civilian internees, and detainees. It addresses those activities that occur between capture by combat elements through repatriation after the end of hostilities. The proper performance of this function in accordance with the Geneva Conventions requires the existence of specially organized and trained units to operate processing and internment facilities. These facilities, when local resources are not available, require significant Engineer construction efforts.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function, in terms of Army goals, relates primarily to the human and management goals. It is a national humanitarian responsibility to follow the obligations and responsibilities specified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Although it is a burden brought about by the very nature of successful combat, its careful management is very important because of the amount of resources devoted to a function which reduces the assets available for supporting combat activities. Even though there is a lot said about this function being accomplished primarily by host nation forces, the fact remains that no formal agreements exist which relieve the United States of its responsibilities with respect to those prisoners of war, civilian internees, and detainees that are captured or detained by US Forces personnel.

2. Longevity. The performance of this function by US Forces personnel is expected to continue out through the 1985 time frame. Even though host nation support agreements may be made during this period, the requirement for US Forces personnel to provide for



some level of evacuation and processing and to maintain full accountability will still exist beyond 1985, unless new conventions are written.

3. Level of military police involvement. The resources required to provide for the full implementation of the US responsibilities and obligations in this functional area are very significant. A trained force ready for quick mobilization and deployment is required. Reduced levels of resources would be required in the event that host nation support agreements are actually made in this functional area. In either case, the nature of prisoner of war, civilian internee, and detainee operations is closely allied with the law enforcement and confinement functions normally associated with the military police, and, consequently, the function should remain with the military police.

Enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations. The performance of this traditional police function involves the use of the military police to extend the authority of the commander throughout the units and areas under his command and control. The military police authority emanates from the highest (UCMJ) level down through the lowest level commander with court martial jurisdiction. The military police gather facts and information for use by the appropriate commander in taking those necessary judicial and nonjudicial actions deemed necessary to maintain the discipline of the command.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, and management goals of the Army. Through

assisting commanders in bringing about voluntary compliance with military laws, orders, and regulations, the performance of this function helps to maintain the necessary orderliness required for a ready force. The enforcement of the laws, orders, and regulations, most of which are designed to insure safety of personnel and protection of their personal property or Government property, supports both the human and management goals.

2. Longevity. The performance of this function throughout the 1985 time period will be necessary. Changes in human nature or new technological advances are not anticipated which will eliminate the need for personnel to enforce the many necessary laws, orders, and regulations.

3. Level of military police involvement. This function will continue to be a primary function performed by military police forces during peacetime. Because of the increase in other functional responsibilities during wartime, i.e., PW operations, security, and rear area protection, the number of resources and time devoted to this function will decrease commensurate with the magnitude of the combat support-oriented functions. Additionally, many of the laws, orders, and regulations that have been promulgated are designed specifically to control activities in a peacetime environment. With the advent of war, the necessity for close control in some areas will be less than during peacetime. All in all, this function will continue to be performed by trained specialists in police enforcement operations.

Participation in those action programs in support of internal defense and stability operations. The performance of this function relates to the use of military police personnel and units to provide planning, training, and operational assistance to host country civil, military, and paramilitary police forces. It also relates to the use of the military police forces in support of stability operations conducted by US Forces in a host country. This function is performed primarily during low-intensity or limited war situations. The military police are generally placed in advisory roles to the host country forces. The importance of this function in light of the present stress on conventional warfare and the downgrading of considerations that may get the US involved in another Vietnam-like situation makes it very unlikely that there will be any significant efforts to prepare US Forces, let alone the military police, to carry out stability operations or internal defense and development actions in the near future. Fortunately, the transfer of skills learned to accomplish military police-oriented functions for other types of conflict is quite simple and will require minimum training to switch emphasis.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness goal of having an Army ready "to respond quickly to contingencies of various intensities." As indicated above, the likelihood of responding to this type of contingency, in the immediate future, is somewhat minimal. Even so, a capability must be maintained at all times.

2. Longevity. The ability to perform this function out through 1985 is valid and remains a separate, identifiable, functional area because of the peculiarities associated with performing in this role in countries generally considered underdeveloped. However, in light of the nature of our present national policy and the stress towards NATO and the ever-present competition for resources, maintenance of a viable capability in this functional area will decrease throughout the next few years.

3. Level of military police involvement. The necessity for heavy involvement of military police advisory efforts in strengthening the capabilities of a host country's own internal defense (civil and military police, and paramilitary security forces) is very important to the overall US effort to help the host country develop an internal ability to protect the host country from the forces causing the unstable conditions. The very nature of military police operations in law enforcement, security (tactical and physical), confinement, and investigations, and the training required to perform those operations make military police personnel the most logical resource for this function.

Prevention and investigation of crime. The performance of this function is basic to military police operations. It is an integral part of the traditional law enforcement function and must necessarily be performed on a continuous basis in conjunction with total police operations. Almost everything that military police units and personnel do in their day-to-day police activities contributes to the



"prevention" of crime. Their presence on patrol, manning security posts, and conducting inspections, to name a few activities, help to create an atmosphere that reduces the opportunity for, and temptation to commit, a crime. The investigation of crimes that have occurred, of course, is usually after-the-fact, and is directed toward collecting investigative facts which will lead to the apprehension of the offender(s) and the recovery of property, if property was involved in the crime. These facts are passed to commanders for their consideration in initiating judicial actions. These facts are also used as a means to develop techniques for the future prevention of similar crimes.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, and management goals of the Army. In the prevention of crime, all of the above goals are supported because of the contribution to maintaining a disciplined force through reducing the possibility of damage to the force through property destruction or theft or injury to a force member. Investigation of crime contributes to all goals through supporting the crime prevention efforts, as indicated before, and in ferreting out those force members who commit crimes in violation of those laws, orders, and regulations which are designed to maintain a well-disciplined force.

2. Longevity. As indicated above, the performance of this function will be required through the 1985 time frame. Suffice it to say that as long as there is an Army, crime will exist, and efforts will be made to prevent crime and to investigate those crimes that occur.



3. Level of military police involvement. Even though many actions can be taken by all force members to prevent crime as it involves their persons or property, a large part of the total prevention effort will be accomplished by military police units and personnel. They are, and will continue to be, actively engaged in prevention activities as described above, and they will provide assistance to other force members on how they can contribute to the effort. The investigation of crime will be primarily a military police (to include the CID) responsibility. For the purpose of clarity in the regulation, these two functions should be separated and indicated as two separate functions. Crime prevention is a much larger, all-encompassing function, while crime investigation is a somewhat specific function oriented on a particular problem area.

Collection, evaluation, and dissemination of police intelligence and information. The performance of this function contributes to the effectiveness of the overall law enforcement, security, and crime prevention and investigation effort. Good police intelligence and information assist operational personnel in allocating resources toward neutralizing and/or eliminating the most likely crime-producing threats and preventing criminal activity in and around military installations and facilities.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, materiel, and management goals of the Army. The rationale follows that discussed for the functions of enforcement, security, and crime prevention and investigation.

2. Longevity. This function will be performed out through the 1985 time frame. Since it is a function that supports most of the other functions performed by the military police, it can be expected to persist along with those functions.

3. Level of military police involvement. This function, although one performed primarily by military police units and personnel, is highly dependent on information gathered from nonmilitary police sources. Military police personnel, however, are the best qualified to collect, evaluate, and disseminate the resulting information to the appropriate personnel and agencies. This function is one that falls into the category of subfunction of enforcement and should be removed from the regulation as requiring a specific and separate listing.

Confinement and correctional treatment of military prisoners. This is a function that involves the operation of various types of confinement facilities at the installation level, and two correctional facilities--the US Army Retraining Brigade (USARB) at Fort Riley, and the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) at Fort Leavenworth. The performance of this function is required when it becomes necessary to confine and hopefully correct those military personnel who choose to conduct themselves in such an antisocial manner where the judicial system indicates that they should be separated from the general population. This is especially important when concentrated efforts are necessary to correct their conduct before they are allowed to reenter the general population, either as a continuing member of the military or as a civilian.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, and management goals of the Army. Admittedly, the support is somewhat negative in nature. Removing from the force those who have or would cause damage to the readiness of the force, those who would decrease the feeling of security or safety of the remaining members of the force, and those who would cause the personnel and equipment management to be more difficult, would allow the remaining well-disciplined members of the force to do a better job.

2. Longevity. The requirement for the performance of this function will continue through the 1985 time period. Since it is a function that generally follows the performance of the law enforcement, security, and crime investigation functions of the military police, it will be necessary to confine and correct personnel who conduct themselves in a way not acceptable to those in the general population.

3. Level of military police involvement. The level of military police involvement is directly proportional to the number of facilities that are to be operated to handle the varying numbers of prisoners that require confining or correcting. As long as those soldiers who require incarceration are to be confined in an Army-operated facility, the facility will be staffed by military police correctional specialists. At the present time, and for the foreseeable future, the average number of prisoners that will be incarcerated will be very low. Actions have been taken to close some

installation-level confinement facilities on a cost-effectiveness basis. Those who must be incarcerated are housed on a contract basis in locally operated city or county jails. In light of the continued reduction of resources to operate facilities, when it becomes non-cost effective to continue operation of a given facility, it should be closed. On the other hand, the facility should not be converted to any other use which will alter the basic structure. These facilities must remain available for quick conversion back to confinement facility operations in the event of mobilization or a change in Army personnel policies which would restrict a commander's authority to quickly discharge soldiers who would ultimately end up as prisoners, if not eliminated from the service.

Control of tactical area of operations. The performance of this function directly supports combat operations, but is not intended to be a substitute for those responsibilities of the armor and infantry. This function grew out of the responsibilities of the military police in Vietnam, where the nature of the combat situation caused the military police to be assigned a specific tactical area of responsibility near USARV Headquarters. In a conventional war, such as one that could erupt in Europe, the assigning of a tactical area of responsibility, per se, with the same frame of reference as was done in Vietnam, would probably not occur. However, as will be discussed in the following functional area of rear area protection, it could be entirely possible that low-level tactical areas of responsibility in the rear areas could very well become a primary function of the military police.

1. Support of the total Army goals. The function in the context discussed above supports the readiness, materiel, and management goals of the Army. Maintaining something more than the catchall capability of "being able to fight as infantry when required" certainly contributes to the overall readiness of the Army to conduct combat operations; it contributes to the overall security of the rear area thereby contributing to the logistical resupply system; and it reduces the management problems that would result from a chaotic rear area.

2. Longevity. This function will require performance out through the 1985 time frame. In conjunction with the following function, the requirement for secure areas in the rear of the combat forces will exist as long as war is fought as it is today and in the foreseeable future.

3. Level of military police involvement. The military police will be involved in combat operations in the rear areas in the context discussed above and as discussed in the following functional area, because of the very nature of what is expected in any future war. Rear areas will not be as secure as they were in past wars. The normal area orientation of military police units and their inherent security mission as discussed above make them the most likely unit to be called upon to neutralize low-level rear area threats. Since the performance of this function will probably become a subfunction of the rear area protection mission of the military police, it would appear appropriate to delete this as a separate



function and include it as a subfunction of rear area protection.

Participation in rear area protection operations and protection of urban areas. The performance of this function relates primarily to protection of personnel, equipment, and facilities in the area in a theater of operations to the rear of the committed combat divisions. Present doctrine assigns a significant role to the military police in participating as part of the total force in rear area protection. Evolving new doctrine virtually assigns the primary mission for rear area protection activities that go beyond the basic requirement for base defense to the military police operating in the rear area.<sup>5</sup> Inherent in present military police organizations that characteristically operate on an area basis is the capability to gather intelligence, to find enemy elements, and to neutralize small enemy elements.<sup>6</sup> In the new doctrine, additional capability is being developed which will significantly enhance the present firepower and mobility to a point where military police units will be able to fight and destroy much larger enemy elements. The criticality of maintaining a rear area which is secure enough to provide a reasonable assurance to the field commanders who expect relatively uninterrupted movement of units, especially combat units, personnel replacements, and materiel; operation of headquarters, supply, and maintenance facilities, and other activities in support of combat operations is obvious. This is even more important today when considering the complexity of modern warfare and level of technology involved in the implements of combat.

1. Support to the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness, human, materiel, management, and strategic deployment goals. Because of those points made in the previous paragraph, the performance of this function is essential to the basic survivability of the Army in the field. Never before has the Army been so dependent on the ability of the logistical system to provide responsive maintenance and resupply support. The units that provide these services are located in the rear area. They cannot provide the necessary level of support unless the area in which they operate is relatively secure. Mechanics, truck drivers, and supply handlers, among others who must constantly engage in rear area protection activities, certainly are not repairing tanks, moving supplies, or loading trucks.

2. Longevity. Modern warfare fought conventionally and at the tactical level requires secure rear areas. Someone will have to perform the function for as long as the possibility of war exists.

3. Level of military police involvement. The finite level of military police involvement will be determined in a study presently being conducted at the US Army Military Police School. At the time of this writing, the military police have been assigned as the executive agent for the development of doctrine for combat in the rear area. It is anticipated that the study will show that the military police with increased capabilities are the most logical force available to accomplish the rear area security mission. Military police will then move from the present participation role to that of implementation.<sup>7</sup>

### CONUS-Oriented Functions

The functions discussed below are those that are stated in the remainder of paragraph 2-20b through k which do not duplicate those discussed in paragraph a above. Subparagraphs b, c, d, f, g, n, p, q, and r are generally functions that are performed as individuals or as unit members which support the accomplishment of the functions discussed in paragraph a above and those discussed below. Consequently, they are not evaluated in the context of this study.

Support civil authorities and/or other military agencies during domestic disturbances and disasters. Although not a sole function of the military police, the performance of this function, in conjunction with other US Forces who provide nonmilitary police support, is significant. The military police are also tasked with the development of the doctrine used by the remainder of the forces in support of civil authorities in handling the domestic disturbance part of this function.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness goal of the Army in that a requirement exists for the handling of domestic disturbances and disasters which are beyond the capability of State and local authorities. Being able to respond to either type situation is critical both to the stability of the Nation and to the reduction of human suffering. Responding quickly with well-trained forces is also an important aspect in building the type of public image that is sorely needed at this time.

2. Longevity. Maintaining a capability to perform this function will be necessary as long as the possibility of unrest and disorder exists. A requirement to respond to disasters, especially those caused by adverse weather, will always exist.

3. Level of military police involvement. As long as US Forces are committed to the handling of either type of problem envisaged in this function, military police forces will be required. The very nature of these two problems requires the performance of the law enforcement, security, investigation, and circulation control functions.

Supervise the promulgation of the Department of Defense Industrial Defense Program. This function, as stated above, is no longer a basic responsibility of the military police at the DA level. Military police personnel at the intermediate levels, i.e., Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Army's Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), have staff responsibilities for monitoring contract actions and other activities pertaining to the defense of industries critical to any war effort in the future. Consequently, action should be taken to delete the function from AR 10-6.

Instruct and advise Reserve and National Guard elements in military police matters. Military police officers and noncommissioned officers are regularly assigned as advisers to Reserve component units throughout the CONUS. Additionally, training teams are sent out from the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS) to various Reserve component military police units.



1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the readiness goal of the Army through insuring that Reserve component military police units are prepared for mobilization and subsequent deployment to an active theater.

2. Longevity. The performance of the function will be required out through the 1985 time frame. It will become more and more important as the active military police force receives strength reductions. It is important to note that performance of some wartime missions relies solely on elements in the Reserve components. For example, prisoner of war, civilian internee, and detainee operations will virtually be conducted by Reserve component elements. Hospital security is another example where this is true.

3. Level of military police involvement. The requirement for Active Army military police involvement, at least at the levels presently being experienced, is essential to the viability of Reserve component military police units. If additional reductions in Active Army military police units are experienced, and if General Support Force (GSF) military police units are civilianized, as is being proposed, much greater emphasis will have to be placed on the readiness of Reserve component units, thereby requiring closer ties between Active Army and Reserve component military police units than presently is the case.

#### Non-Police-Oriented Functions

The functions discussed below are being performed by military police throughout CONUS. They could be considered as subfunctions



of a previously discussed function, but are generally not considered as such. Many of them have been assigned to the military police because of some small connection with the more traditional functions of the military police or because installation commanders do not know where else to put the task.

Provide for wildlife protection. At several installations, military police personnel--primarily middle grade noncommissioned officers--are assigned to managing the hunting and fishing activities, and are usually titled game wardens. This primarily includes the enforcement of State, Federal, and command hunting, fishing, and trapping regulations and directives. In recent years the duties have been expanded to include environmental control, conservation management, and animal control.

1. Support to the total Army goals. This function supports the human and management goals of the Army. The complexity of wildlife management, with emphasis on environmental and conservation management, requires that the function be performed in a manner that insures that military personnel receive the benefits from the program while participating within the parameters of laws, regulations, and directives. Also, the program must be managed on military installations at a level commensurate with that of the surrounding State.

2. Longevity. The function will be performed out through the 1985 time period. It can be anticipated that as time passes the emphasis will increase on the overall management of the program, and that more resources will probably be required to do it properly.

Even though this program does not contribute directly to the combat readiness of the force, environmental and conservation considerations will not allow less emphasis.

3. Level of military police involvement. This is the area where basic changes appear to be warranted. As indicated previously, the function is being performed at many installations solely by military police personnel. In the past, when the primary problem was the enforcement of laws, regulations, and directives, usually by dispatching patrols into hunting and fishing areas, the use of military police personnel appeared logical and probably an acceptable method to insure adherence to the rules. However, with the addition of the environmental and conservation considerations, which are actually beginning to overshadow the enforcement aspects, it would appear logical that some changes should be made. This is suggested for several reasons. First, military police noncommissioned officers are not trained in environmental and conservation aspects of hunting and fishing activities. Second, the shortage of military police personnel to accomplish those other functions more closely allied with their training and experience requires that they not be assigned to this type function. Third, the conservation and environmental responsibilities in terms of real estate and animal population appear to fall within the purview of the Directorate of Facilities Engineering and others. Fourth, the environmental and conservation aspects of this function alone have taken on such a significant level of importance and visibility that the accomplishment by personnel

who learn through OJT and do not compare in knowledge and experience with their civilian counterparts could leave the Army open for criticism. These four reasons are only the most significant ones that come to mind. Action should be taken to conduct an in-depth study on this functional area to insure that it is being performed by appropriately trained personnel, and the various facets of the function are supervised by the correct staff element on an installation.

Animal control. This function can be more succinctly described as dog- or cat-catching. It usually involves the periodic catching and disposing of the stray dogs or cats that tend to populate military installations. In some instances, it involves monitoring follow-up actions after an animal bite. Again, it is a function that must be accomplished, essentially for the safety of the inhabitants of the installation. The performance of the function is one usually assigned the military police. It usually involves capture either by physically catching the animal or by using a dart which injects a stunning drug that allows for easier capturing. Including this function as one worthy of significant discussion may seem ludicrous because of the nature of the task. This would be so if it was not for the significant number of personnel who are involved in performing the function on a full-time basis at military installations. The magnitude of the problem at Fort Dix, for example, requires that five military police personnel be assigned to animal control duties on a full-time basis.

1. Support to total Army goals. This function supports the human goal primarily because of the safety and medical aspects.

2. Longevity. Unless other means can be discovered to rid military installations of stray dogs and cats, this function will be performed out through the 1985 time frame.

3. Level of military police involvement. Someone will have to handle this problem. Using military police seems to be a waste of police-trained manpower for a task which appears more closely allied with medical, specifically veterinarian, activities. It appears that this functional area, especially in those instances where full-time personnel resources are required to control the animal population, should be transferred to the medical activity.

#### Functions Requiring More Emphasis

The functions discussed below are those that should be elevated to the level of primary concern and given the necessary visibility to insure that there is no doubt regarding where the responsibility lies for the performance of a particular function. They have grown to significant problem level magnitude in recent years because of basic changes in the social structure of society and of the family group.

Prevent and neutralize terrorist activities occurring on or against military installations. Although no overt terrorist-oriented actions have been taken against CONUS military installations to this date, there are several organized, known terrorist groups which operate within the borders of the United States who could redirect their activities toward the US Military Establishment at anytime. Even



though the FBI has primary responsibility for handling terrorist incidents occurring within CONUS, the responsibility for taking immediate counterterrorist actions on a military installation lies with the commander, and subsequently, with his police or security force. Handling true terrorist activities, because of the usual violent and media-oriented nature of terrorist action, is not analogous to handling a serious crime-oriented hostage or kidnapping situation. The terrorist incident is usually designed to further some political ideology through taking a violent action against some target of significance which will draw extensive media coverage. There is usually some connection between the terrorist act--although sometimes quite remote--and some political aim of the terrorist group. Because of this difference in orientation, it is imperative that the Military Establishment take necessary immediate action to train forces and develop plans to handle terrorist situations. This, in addition to the action presently being taken to provide a trained element to conduct antiterrorist or hostage operations at overseas locations.

1. Support of the total Army goals. Even though counterterrorist operations on the part of US Army elements are not considered as an integral part of the mission to conduct combat operations in an armed conflict with an enemy force, it could become a primary mission of the Military Establishment very quickly. Carrying out counterterrorist activities within the CONUS will support, as a minimum, the readiness, human, and strategic deployment goals. The Army must be ready to respond to any threat of a terrorist nature to



insure the safety and protection of all personnel working and living on military installations. Although, hopefully, somewhat remote, the insidious nature of terrorist activities could threaten the strategic deployment of nuclear strike forces or reinforcements to a wartime theater. This is particularly true if it should ever reach the level of terrorism presently being experienced in Italy.

2. Longevity. Fortunately, the performance of this function has not been required on military installations in CONUS. On the other hand, terrorist actions have been taken against US Military installations in overseas locations. In this regard, and until terrorist actions are no longer fashionable or productive in terms of terrorist goals, the US Army must be concerned with and prepared to respond with trained counterterrorist forces. Since these kinds of phenomena rarely fade away quickly, especially when they are being relatively successful on an international basis, maintaining a capability to respond to this threat out through and beyond the 1985 time frame appears to be required.

3. Level of military police involvement. As indicated earlier, the basic initial responsibility for handling terrorist incidents on US Army installations will ultimately fall on the installation military police or security force. This means that the responsibility for training the responding forces, for developing and writing contingency plans, for coordinating with local city, State, and Federal police agencies, and for obtaining the required equipment is assigned to the installation provost marshal or security officer.

Some of this is presently being done at installations where a high threat exists. Unfortunately, much of it is being done without any standard Army policy, or procedural or doctrinal base. Action is being taken at present to promulgate an Army Regulation to provide DA-level guidance.<sup>8</sup> Doctrine is being developed at the Military Police School. This function is police oriented and should be performed by military police units and personnel. Unit and individual training should be initiated as soon as possible.

Provide for the prevention of juvenile delinquency on military installations. The performance of this function is becoming more significant today than ever before. Although it is somewhat of an admission of failure on the part of military parents to indicate that significant juvenile control problems exist throughout the Army and on its installations, it is a fact which requires a concerted effort by all concerned to insure that action is taken to prevent juvenile delinquency. Even though this function may be considered as a sub-function of crime prevention, it is one that requires greater emphasis and more special handling than presently being given at all levels in the Army. Installation provost marshals in recent years have been required, because of the magnitude of the problem, to take action through diverting regular enforcement and security forces to juvenile control activities.

1. Support of the total Army goals. This function supports the human goal of the Army. Juvenile offenders can be identified early and then placed in a program which may prevent further delinquency.

2. Longevity. As long as dependents live on military installations and follow their sponsors to overseas assignments, juvenile delinquency will be a problem that will require professional handling.

3. Level of military police involvement. The present involvement of the military police in this function is oriented at the two extremes of the problem. At some installations they have very little to do except to detain juvenile offenders and process them in accordance with the appropriate directives, and virtually do nothing more. On other installations they carry out the full range of prevention, detention, counseling, and other nonmilitary police-oriented actions. As with terrorism, this function needs to receive much greater visibility and should be elevated to a specifically assigned function that falls under the DA-level control of the DCSPER, with the Law Enforcement Division writing an implementing regulation. Even though many other agencies must be involved in the actual handling of the juvenile offender problem, one DA-level staff agency must take the responsibility for developing and initiating an overall program. Training must be initiated at various service schools to insure proper training of those who should become involved in solving this problem. The seriousness of this situation, coupled with the employment of necessary techniques required to reach beyond the law enforcement aspects to those psychological and social causative factors involving the parents, require something more than the present training being given to military police personnel. Provost Marshals

who find themselves with a significant problem in the juvenile offender area have been forced to rely, if possible, on finding military police personnel with civilian backgrounds in counseling, social work, or other fields where interpersonal relationships are important. Failing this, the time-honored OJT system is used. The trial and error aspects of this are too numerous to discuss.

#### Function to be Eliminated

The vehicle registration function should be eliminated at CONUS installations as not being required for the effective performance of an installation's law enforcement mission. This function involves the registration of vehicles that habitually enter a particular military installation. It usually involves the operation of a vehicle safety inspection activity and the operation of an administrative activity which records driver identification, safety inspection, and insurance coverage information, and issues a different colored decal, depending upon status (officer, NCO, civilian, or contractor), for each vehicle registered. The administrative activity usually is tasked to record the points received from receiving a traffic violation on the driver's driving record. Depending on the size of, and population living and working on, the installation, and the number of vehicles normally registered, the vehicle registration activity could require a full-time staff of 8 to 10 personnel.

Background. The requirement to register vehicles on installations was a result of several valid reasons which existed many years ago. The most significant ones were:



1. A requirement to be able to quickly identify vehicles authorized to enter an installation through using a special decal.

2. A requirement to be able to quickly locate a vehicle owner or to determine identity of the owner of a vehicle involved in an incident.

3. A requirement to have a means to quickly determine if a vehicle on an installation was properly insured in accordance with Army Regulations.

Rationale for elimination. Each of the reasons mentioned above has virtually been negated for the following reasons:

1. There are very few closed military installations, especially Army installations, where the checking of decals at the entrances is required. In fact, many installations no longer place military police personnel at all of their gates. When the gates are manned, it is primarily for the purpose of providing information for guests and visitors.

2. The advent of automatic data processing and the extensive communications networks that exist between State motor vehicle registration agencies and local, municipal, and State police agencies allow the military police to obtain driver and other vehicle identification information very quickly. In fact, during nonduty hours it is much quicker than could be expected on an installation.

3. State laws on safety inspection and insurance requirements now generally exceed those stated in Army Regulations.



Consequently, it would appear logical that the present requirement to register vehicles is no longer valid, except as a nice-to-have function on most CONUS installations. Because of high security requirements at some installations, and the necessity to control vehicle movements very carefully, registration may be required. Additionally, vehicle registration activities at overseas locations should continue as a necessary function in support of the forces. Registering vehicles in overseas locations without expert guidance and assistance would be very time consuming.

The one aspect that should not be eliminated is the requirement to maintain traffic violation points on drivers. This contributes directly to the installation safety program and is important in insuring that habitual violators of traffic laws are prohibited from driving on the installation.

#### OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the two Army Regulations 10-5 and 10-6 indicates many functional inconsistencies and duplications which need to be addressed during the next update of these regulations. This effort should be carried through to the next update of the Army Manual. Included in the above discussions are several suggestions that should be considered in the next update of the two regulations.

Except for the function of industrial defense, those functions listed in AR 10-5 and 10-6 are valid military police functions which support at least one, but usually more than one, Army goal. They

will all require performance out through the 1985 time frame, with most of them being required as long as there is an Army which is organized similar to that which exists today. As indicated in the detailed discussion above, some of them do not require the visibility of being listed in the two regulations.

The function of supervising the DOD Industrial Defense Program should be deleted from AR 10-6 as a function performed by members of the military police. DOD is now actively engaged in supervising and directing the program. The Defense Logistics Agency acts as the DOD action agency in implementing the program.

Although not directly mentioned in either regulation, action should be taken at the DA level to recommend the elimination of vehicle registration activities at those installations where a special requirement does not exist to continue registration. A significant manpower and money savings should result.

A separate in-depth study should be made to evaluate the significance of wildlife protection and animal control activities, and to determine the best method for accomplishing these functions. They are not logical sole military police functions. Personnel in other skill areas are better qualified and should be involved in, and probably should supervise the performance of, both functions.

The ongoing action to publish an Army Regulation pertaining to counterterrorism activities on military installations needs to be accomplished quickly, and the training base needs to add necessary training in the appropriate schools to insure that the Army--

especially its military police and intelligence-gathering assets--  
is ready to respond professionally to a terrorist act or threat of  
an act.

The function of preventing juvenile delinquency must be raised  
to a level of significance and visibility where the necessary emphasis  
will be given and the required personnel and financial resources will  
be allocated to insure that the dependent children of military members  
are given at least the same, but hopefully better, assistance from  
Army sources as they would receive if they lived in the surrounding  
offpost community.

## CHAPTER II

### FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-5, pp. 2-16, 2-18 (hereafter referred to as "AR 10-5").
2. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-6, pp. 2-8, 2-9 (hereafter referred to as "AR 10-6").
3. AR 10-6, pp. 2-8, 2-9.
4. AR 10-5, pp. 2-10.
5. Interview with Douglas G. MacNair, COL, US Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, 15-16 March 1978.
6. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-85, pp. 3-1 and D-2.
7. Interview with Douglas G. MacNair, COL, US Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, 15-16 March 1978.
8. US Department of the Army, (Draft) Army Regulation 19- , p. 32.

## CHAPTER III

### INSTALLATION FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

The Military Police Corps today is operating in a beleaguered environment--one of consistent reductions in resources and continuous demands for expansion of capabilities. The Army has continued to shave its military resources in noncombat jobs to expand the fighting divisions; it has shortened military training and many other actions to maintain readiness within decreasing budget levels. All have been affected even more by the dramatic impact of inflation.

Policies have been developed which have established that military personnel will be assigned only to duties requiring military training, discipline, and performance. The problems of discipline, control, and law have, in the past, basically ruled out any general policy of assigning civilians to military functions.

#### PURPOSE

The purpose of this chapter is to:

- Evaluate force structure of Military Police General Support Forces (GSF).
- Examine civilianization of GSF forces.
- Analyze the police services' approach and law enforcement activities concept.
- Examine military police organizational structure to meet installation law enforcement requirements.



### ASSUMPTIONS

- No increase in military police end strength.
- Micromanagement of nondeployable forces will continue.
- Requirements for law enforcement support will continue to exist at installations.
- Assigned strength will remain the same.

### FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING

The rationale for the total force program is twofold:

First, the defense of the United States requires forces in-being, manned with people already trained and available to respond.

Second, cost is the controlling factor--getting the most for the dollar.

These concepts are transformed into the development of manpower/force structures which takes place in the Planning, Programing, Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS itself is a complex, continuous cycle of actions and events through which requirements are identified and resources are allocated.<sup>1</sup>

The military police force structure (Active and Reserve) is determined annually by the total force analysis, which is conducted as a part of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development cycle. The analysis is guided by the general officer steering group based on:

- Army Force Guidance (AFG) submitted for development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOPS) Volume II, which provides

the objective force necessary to meet the threat presently in JSOP Volume I.

-- Guidance provided in the Tentative Planning Programing Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) on force and fiscal programs.

-- The input from DA Staff and doctrinal proponents concerning number and type of units.

The above guidance is subsequently provided to MACOMS in the form of Consolidated Guidance. The MACOM responses to Army guidance are provided in submission of Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) documents for input into the POM development.

The POM force is heavily constrained, and, in short, represents what the Army will buy in terms of forces. When developed and approved, it determines what the Army will get, beginning the next fiscal year.

The basic tool used to determine military police requirements for the total force analysis is the Force Analysis Simulation Theater Administrative and Logistical Support Model (FASTALS) which uses input data from existing unit TOE's, current doctrinal and support concepts, and Army plans and programs to generate troop list.<sup>2</sup>

General Support Forces are not considered in FASTALS Model, and thus require annual survey to justify continual requirements.

Military police organizations can be divided into three broad classifications: (1) Combat Support, (2) Special Forces, and (3) General Support Forces. The number and types of units in each category are a function of military strategy and of the design capabilities of each kind of organization.

When the force structure is changed, the manpower analysis of the revised structure frequently results in a different number of authorized spaces.

Budget changes, force structure alterations, and manpower changes may occur immediately and with a stroke of the pen. The personnel system, however, is tied to time--weeks, and normally months, are required before people-status can be changed.

The future of our Nation rests on its capability to maintain a responsive military force. The Military Police Corps is an important part of the force. In order to conserve the most essential resource--people--the Army must seek means to increase the effectiveness of space and manpower justification. It is equally important that we weigh each new program to avoid a short gain but a long-term loss.

#### FORCE REDUCTIONS

In 1977, Congress authorized the Army an end strength of 787,000 personnel for FY78, and also indicated possible future reductions in FY79 to 771,000--a drop of 17,000 in one year. The Army immediately took positive action and revised the FY78 strength to 774,000. By gradually preparing for the new strength of 771,000, the Army will only face a manpower reduction of about 3,000 soldiers in FY79.<sup>3</sup>

Any reduction is always followed by a maximization of combat forces. Cuts in BCT/AIT training time, training base reductions, and a concentrated effort to civilianize, where possible, are part of the most recent reductions.

While cuts are being studied, there is increased pressure on elements of the combat support and combat service support structure. In particular, the military police force is under close scrutiny. The major impact is in the General Support Forces where considerable risk occurs--the reduction of authorizations in GSF while increasing borrowed manpower from STRAF units.

Future cuts in General Support Forces are clear, but there is less than unanimity on the question of how far we can go in converting the tail ratio without severely affecting the STRAF force. Every position lost can be viewed as one less replacement to the committed force.

The real issue is how, and to what extent, the cuts will be made, and what is the impact on the overall mission and the Army?

Historically, the record is not encouraging. Our desire to project the strongest possible image within the peacetime budgets has generally led to impractically weak support forces. Thus, we have ended all wars with enormous structures calling for a new round of excessive pruning, and begin the next war with poor preparation and massive callups.

A diminishing threat often results in increasing pressure to decrease the Armed Forces. However, as the Government yields to these pressures, they are reluctant to concede any perceived decrease in security. Then the classic argument is made: "Cuts have been made in the combat and service support forces without reducing combat power."

The methods being adopted to effect reductions in support forces show numerous approaches--some new, some logical, some which defy explanation, some simple, and others complicated and sophisticated. Examples of the different types of approaches can be roughly divided into four general categories.

1. Arbitrary reductions. Cut the force by 10 percent or revert to the totals of 10 years ago. Such arbitrary measures can be expected in the wake of a sharp lowering of overall manpower ceilings. One of the major actions of this type was one mandated by the US Congress--the so-called Nunn Amendment. Implicit in the Nunn Amendment was a conviction that noncombat forces could be reduced with little or no loss in combat power. Another example is the comparison of the 1964 16-division force, and today. These types of comparisons stem from a misunderstanding and/or a lack of appreciation of the total contribution that support units make to the effectiveness of the combat force.

2. Comparing statistics. Those who make such comparisons are still fighting the same enemy, with the same weapons, under the same battlefield conditions.

The US national regard for fair treatment and the welfare of its soldiers, and a belief in humane treatment of all personnel, impose a support burden on our forces never faced by any other nation. There are many other areas in which support practiced by other countries is totally unacceptable. Control and treatment of prisoners of war, a major bargaining tool, is just an example.



3. Switching responsibility. The elementary way to reduce active duty military police general support force structure is to assign the function to another source. Experience indicates that the most likely candidates are Reserve or civilians and/or contractual agencies. If a function is not a problem or should only be performed in the event of war, why not eliminate it? Prisoners of war are again an example. Another is the correctional specialist--assuming that desertion or AWOL won't be a problem. Another area of possible cut is to civilianize the military police general support forces who, in theory, are only needed to perform law enforcement missions in CONUS.

The danger here is in our possible failure to fully recognize the limitations that are imposed along with the advantages. Maintaining the status of critical Reserve units must be such as to enable the support to be provided. Today, this is not the case. Further, it is unrealistic to consider wartime roles for civilian organizations. The Army cannot simply accept the military space savings without identifying off-setting costs and weaknesses. Civilianization of military functions, use of contractors, and assignment of missions to Reserve Forces offer a means to achieve green suit reductions, but other issues and complex factors involved need to be recognized and accepted before reductions are made.

4. Improving performance by innovation or new equipment. This category includes those innovative actions to improve the efficiency of military police support, thereby reducing the need for

organizations and personnel. This involves new concepts, new organizations, and/or new equipment. Certainly, this is the preferred way to achieve a reduction. Unfortunately, it is also the most difficult and most expensive.

The real risk is that any reduction taken will adversely affect the combat force to the point that it will not be able to fully accomplish its mission. As General Abrams once said, "Ill-considered cuts in support forces are paid for with the lives of fighting men."<sup>4</sup>

To accomplish the necessary reductions with minimum risk will tax the ability of those involved, but real improvements in efficiency and economy are possible. The need for results has already given birth to arguments and some unwise actions. Some proposals now under consideration are likely to further degrade our total operational capability. Two things are required:

First, actions must be initiated to continue to identify timely, innovative ways to improve our efficiency.

Second, maximum flexibility and capability must be maintained.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Military police organizational structures are designed for austerity, and follow the basic guidance provided by the Department of the Army.

-- Eliminate dual or excess capabilities not essential to the accomplishment of the unit mission.

-- Use the least expensive, yet most efficient, equipment to accomplish the mission.

-- Assign additional duties in conjunction with primary duties where possible.

-- Keep positions and grade levels to the minimum in accordance with the standards of grade authorizations.

-- Provide for only the minimum essential personnel and equipment requested by current doctrine.

In summary, in developing military police organizations, we have gone toward a criteria of minimum essential.

TRADOC has the responsibility for the design of the Army's TOE's, and TRADOC Pamphlet 310-4, "Military Publications, Reference Digest of Tables of Organization and Equipment," 1 November 1976, provides a digest of military police units and includes the past and current TOE's. The H-series TOE incorporates the latest equipment changes and force structure concepts. All CONUS military police organizations are organized under the H-series.

At first glance, the TOE development process appears to be a maze of regulations complicated by multiple changes, laden with details, and too difficult to attempt to change; however, the system is a necessary and efficient process. AR 310-31, "Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment," is the bible for the entire TOE System. AR 570-4 provides the "Human Resource Management System," and AR 570-2 provides the criteria for TOE manpower utilization.

The end result of TOE design is to provide an array of functional units that can be assembled in a number of ways to satisfy a force structure.

The TOE units of the Military Police Corps are all organized under a Modified TOE (MTOE), usually modified to meet specific geographical or operational requirements.

TDA (Tables of Distribution and Allowance) are designed on an individual basis. Unlike TOE's, TDA's are designed by field organizations to satisfy existing requirements. Each TDA is unique and is authorized only those resources that are essential to perform the stated tasks. TDA resource requirements must be considered by force planners in developing the force structure since resources allocated to TDA are not available to TOE units.

All civilian manpower requirements are normally contained in TDA documents.

#### CRIME TRENDS AND RATES AT CONUS INSTALLATIONS

Crime rates represent the number of founded offenses (computed at a rate per thousand) reported by each installation on DA Form 2819.

The statistical data gathered makes a comparison of the years 1973 (draft environment), 1975 (beginning of all-volunteer force), and the calendar year of 1977. A detailed report is shown in Table I.

AWOL and desertion rates continue to decrease--decreasing from 1973 to the present by approximately 300 percent. Crimes of violence category (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) were up in 1975, but down approximately 4 percent in 1977. A comparison of the percentage by types of total crimes of violence offenses reveals

that murder decreased 1 percent in 1977, while rape has continued to increase since 1973. Robbery decreased 4 percent in 1975 and 12 percent in 1977. Aggravated assault increased 2 percent in 1975 and 9½ percent in 1977. Aggravated assault was the predominant offense in 1977, constituting 51.5 percent of the crimes of violence category (see Table II). Crimes against property (larceny, burglary, house-breaking, and auto theft) have not substantially changed when comparing the calendar years of 73-75-77.

In drug offenses, the predominant offense continues to be the use and possession of marihuana, with a steady increase of approximately 1 percent in calendar years 75 and 77. In the sale and trafficking of narcotics, there has been a small decline of founded offenses.

The CONUS rate in crimes of violence per 1,000 continues to be approximately 60 percent of the overseas rate. While the crimes against property rate in CONUS has remained essentially the same, the overseas rate has decreased. CONUS and overseas marihuana use and possession are compatible. The sale and trafficking of narcotics and dangerous drugs rate is approximately 2½ times that of the CONUS rate.

In the fourth quarter of calendar year 77, 68 percent of the crimes of violence occurred on post, while 94 percent of the crimes against property occurred off post. 99 percent of the marihuana use and 70 percent of the sale and trafficking of dangerous drugs occurred on post.<sup>5</sup>



The final analysis is that AWOL and deserter categories are the only categories with a substantial decrease, and in the calendar years 73, 75, and 77, the military police were not completely involved with apprehending deserters. However, the FBI has requested to be released from desertion apprehensions, which is pending a decision. When approved, the military police will be required to increase absentee programs.

#### CIVILIANIZATION OF SPACES IN GSF MILITARY POLICE UNITS

The Army's last major DOD-directed civilianization program was accomplished between 1 April 1973 and 30 December 1975, during which time 14,080 military positions were converted to civilians. The stated purpose was to reduce accession requirements for military personnel in a zero draft environment.

On January 27, 1977, the Secretary of Defense directed ASD to undertake a priority analysis of the use of civilians. In February 1977, the Army was directed to identify and document the military positions that are essential and the impact of increased civilianization, and to assess the impact of substituting civilians for 1 percent/3 percent/5 percent of the force.

According to OSD, the principal incentive to convert jobs from military to civilian or contractor is to reduce manpower costs.<sup>6</sup>

OSD has made some basic assumptions in defining savings.

-- The cost of military/civilian people on the job is basically the same.

-- Savings come primarily from indirect savings such as recruiting and initial training-related costs.

-- There would be some modest savings in medical expenses.

-- The major cost savings are accession related and come from the cost of "the hard-to-recruit manpower."

According to OSD, the marginal cost of recruiting a male high school graduate is \$3,700--mental categories I - III--and the reduction of one military position will reduce annual accessions needs by one-third of an accession per year. In addition, training costs can be reduced by about one-third of the amount it costs to train one man. OSD estimates the Army obtains about three productive man-years for each accession. Therefore, DOD estimates the annual savings for each male space eliminated would be \$2,750 annually from recruiting and training.

OSD has also emphasized the relative cost savings of substitution or contracting out. They have stressed that if a function is demilitarized, a contractor can perform the function.

#### OSD Assessment of Service Substitution Potential

In FY 78, the Army will have about 6,400 soldiers in nondeploying military police units at CONUS installations. This same function is performed at many DOD installations by general service administrators or contract manpower. Substituting the manpower in these nondeploying units would reduce active duty military police manpower by almost 30 percent, but would only reduce combined active duty and Reserve component military police by 13 percent.<sup>7</sup>

The Army strongly recommended against civilianization other than that which was included in the FY 79-83 POM, due to adverse impacts on readiness--specifically mobilization. The Army also pointed out the effects on the rotation base, training, and career development.

FY 79-83 POM included the reduction of 1,156 (FY 79, 579; FY 80, 577) nonmilitary police personnel in non-STRAF military police units.

1. The composition of the defense work force results in a collection of general rules contained in several directives. These rules can be summarized as follows:

a. Uniformed personnel are to be assigned to jobs that, in the judgment of the Armed Forces, require a military incumbent.

b. All other jobs are to be filled by Federal civilians or contracted for in the civilian sector. The services must prove that a military person is required.

c. Reliance on the private sector is encouraged. The services or agencies must prove that a compelling reason exists to keep certain jobs in-house.

2. The guidance relating to civilian employment provided to the military departments by the Secretary of Defense is:

Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness; which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved; and which do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment (Department of Defense Directive

1100.4). The unusual hour criterion was omitted from a later DOD directive (1400.5).

Military history is full of examples of an interchangeability of civilian and military positions. In 1965, the Department of the Army, under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), compiled a history describing the use of civilians in terms of types of functions and duties in the Army (US Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, History of Military-Civilian Substitutionability, October 1965). The following resume was taken from that study.<sup>8</sup>

1. Revolutionary War. Civilians occupied staff positions throughout the war with (active) officers as heads of staff agencies. Civilians were used extensively as engineers and supply support. Civilian terms of service ran from 1 year to day-to-day operations, and were not enforceable by military law. The greatest problem arose from the lack of control and discipline.

2. War of 1812. From 1798 to 1812, supply of the Army was totally a civilian function. Congress then charged the Secretary of War with the duties of Quartermaster General, and the military took control of supply. Contractual transportation was used in the rear supply lines.

3. Mexican War. The first time the Army had to support overseas-type operations was during this war. Civilians again took over supply and service operations. This effort was accomplished by

hiring transportation, mechanics, and laborers as needed. By the end of the war, there were over 5,000 civilians with General Winfield Scott's Army of 27,000.

4. Civil War. The requirements for support, although greatly increased, remained basically the same as in previous conflicts. By 1864, all railroads and the telegraph were under civilian control.

5. Spanish-American War. Mistakes were no different from in the beginning--a lack of support. The Army General Staff was introduced in 1903. Congressional interest in support of problems resulted in an act being passed, on 24 August 1912, that established a service corps, not to exceed 6,000 enlisted men, to do the work of clerks, engineers, firemen, carpenters, blacksmiths, packers, and laborers. On June 30, 1915, the service corps proudly proclaimed that 1,594 civilians and 2,045 detailed soldiers were replaced by 2,816 enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps.

6. World War I. Two of the greatest problems of the war were getting the troops and supplies to France. Initially the Army owned ships that were manned by civilian crews. Labor problems became so acute that responsibility for running the ships was turned over to the Navy in the summer of 1917. To preclude diverting combat soldiers to labor tasks, local nationals were hired in France. By the end of 1918, over 47,000 civilian workers--nearly all French citizens--were in the service of the Army.



7. World War II. There was not a deliberate program of civilian substitutions for military personnel in World War II. Civilians were hired or commissioned for jobs requiring specialized skills. The Women's Army Corps was created, and, for the most part, accomplished tasks that would have normally been accomplished by civilians. Of the approximately 1,000,000 civilian workers employed by the Army, 8 percent were in the general administration overhead; 7 percent in procurement; and the remainder (85 percent) were in arsenals, supply depots, port operations, and construction. Officers and enlisted personnel were still used extensively for the administration and operations at installations in CONUS.

From 1943 to the end of the war, numerous circulars were published, all oriented toward placing civilians in nonmilitary jobs and releasing military personnel from overhead duties.

#### Cost Comparisons

Which costs more--civilian or military employees? Attempts to answer this controversial question have long centered on published worldwide cost factors averaged in an attempt to make comparisons of the total annual cost. One particular study was done for the Committee on Armed Services for the 95th Congress, which has been used as a backup for numerous OSD studies. The study is in great detail and emphasizes comparative analysis of total pay and entitlements for military and civilian employees. The cost factors were developed from an examination of three types of cost: (1) compensation-related, (2) pipeline, and (3) support.<sup>9</sup>

Military compensation-related costs include base pay, quarters, subsistence allowance, and tax advantages. It also includes retirement, reenlistment bonuses, dependents' indemnity compensation, medical and educational benefits, and unemployment compensation. For civilian employees, compensation includes base pay, overtime and holiday pay, life insurance, retirement, health benefits, unemployment and workers' compensation, and terminal leave.

Pipeline costs are the costs associated with personnel turnovers, training, travel, and other costs such as overhead costs. There are no civilian overhead costs in the comparisons.

Support costs for the military include feeding, operations, recreation, welfare, and morale functions.

For the purpose of this study, the cost comparison is oriented toward one specific skill--.0083, police--and refers to the present inventory in the Department of the Army. Of the 191 .0083 police presently employed, there are: (Average grade is GS-05/GS-06)

$\frac{03}{1}$	$\frac{04}{47}$	$\frac{05}{110}$	$\frac{06}{14}$	$\frac{07}{13}$	$\frac{08}{2}$	$\frac{09}{4}$
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Comparisons of cost-related data, as used in the study submitted to the 95th Congress, are ineffective when specific types of spaces are being considered for conversion. To effectively compare a cost savings, each specific occupational position must be related to the specific military position.

See Table III for the E3/4/5 and G3/G4/G5 cost comparison data as pointed out by the study submitted to the Committee on Armed Services. The figures as outlined by the study clearly show a cost

advantage to civilians; however, the study fails to point out specific cost factors for police. Example: Civilians are governed by specific regulations and are on a 5-day workweek (40 hours per week). Police fall under a specific work differential rate which entitles them to pay proposals over and above the normal pay entitlements, such as:<sup>10</sup>

A 10 percent increase in pay at an hourly rate for any work falling between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Monday through Saturday, excluding holidays (affecting two of three normal daily shifts).

A 25 percent increase in pay at an hourly rate for the period of 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Sundays and holidays, and the additional 10 percent increase for the period of 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on Sundays and holidays.

For work over and above 8-hour shifts daily, a 50 percent increase is paid at an hourly rate, and any work over and above 40 hours a week is paid a 50 percent increase.

Police and guard forces are also entitled to what is called "callback overtime," where individuals are required to report on a day when work was not scheduled, or when required to return to work. Regardless of minimum length of callback, the employment is deemed at least 2 hours in duration.

The congressional study also pointed out that training costs on an annual basis for military, when compared to civilians, exceeded \$1,000 savings per person per year. However, the Civilian Personnel Occupational Standard Regulation CPOS-083 for police and guard forces

specifically directs that formal training will be provided at each grade level, and examination revealed the training was compatible with that of military police.

There are also special provisions by law that provide civilian law enforcement personnel additional benefits over and above normal civilian forces, which must be considered in comparing cost factors.

Law enforcement personnel may voluntarily retire at the age of 50 if they have completed 20 years of service. Law enforcement personnel also receive additional annuities by taking  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent of the 3-year average pay multiplied by all service over 20 years (including unused sick leave).

Another item that must be considered in calculating cost comparisons is the indication that recruiting costs are compounded by hard-to-recruit MOS's. The military police field has been oversubscribed by recruiting, and, in fact, is one of the least expensive MOS's to recruit. According to Recruiting Command, the average cost per individual recruited is \$1,280.00, and if the enlistment bonus is added, the marginal cost of recruiting is about \$3,700.00, as indicated by OSD; however, the military police are not a hard-to-recruit MOS, and are not provided bonuses. The average cost of recruiting military police is calculated at \$1,000.00--\$2,700.00 less than the OSD estimate.

When comparing grades, it should also be oriented toward skill levels, and a comparison of skills indicates that for the police field, a skill level GS 0083 in grade of GS-05 would normally replace an E-3/E-4 military policeman.



### Legality of Civilianization

Problems arise in the area of apprehension of military personnel for the commission of military offenses. Paragraph 19 of the Manual for Courts Martial gives military police authority to apprehend persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In regard to the apprehensions of civilian personnel, civilian personnel and police have essentially equal authority. Basically, the applicable statute provides that one person may arrest another person (1) for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such a felony and (2) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his presence.

On January 30, 1978, a proposed bill was submitted to the Senate aimed at authorizing selected civilians and employees of DOD to have the authority to apprehend individuals on a military installation. The bill specifically states that the Secretary of Defense is authorized to invest the authority for officers and employees of the Department of Defense to include individuals under contract to provide police services and to have the power to apprehend individuals on military and Federal installations.

As of the writing of this study, the bill was under consideration by the Armed Services Committee, pending decision.

From a purely precedent standpoint, it appears to be unwise to convert any area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction to civilian contract law enforcement. The use of civilian/military police mix on an installation would be unmanageable. In essence, any mix would



create two police forces, one answering directly to the military commander and the other to a civilian/union and/or contractor boss. A significant problem is the differences in work schedules. For example, military police normally work 8-hour shifts, but are required to be on duty from 9 to 9½ hours due to inspections, briefings, and debriefings. Civilian personnel would normally only be required to work 8 hours.

#### Contract Services

Of all the alternatives, contractual services is the least acceptable method. Contractual services have been used in several locations to augment military/civilian forces; however, careful consideration should be given to the consequences of annual contract negotiations, security clearance problems, costs, strikes, unions, and legal liabilities. As was recognized in a worldwide survey of military police support, "The sophisticated threat to the security of installations demands vigorous, alert, and highly responsible Military Police."

According to Major General Elmer Ochs, Commanding General and Commandant, Military Police School and Training Center, Fort McClellan, "Civilian contracts normally require additional military spaces to insure the contractor meets the contract." He further stated, "We should never forget that the contractor's main purpose is to make a profit, and profit oriented operations should not be substituted for law enforcement."

### The Effects of Civilianization on Individual Replacements

If GSF military police units are civilianized, there will be no source of individual replacements to accomplish three very critical actions.

1. Deploying STRAF units will have to deploy with less than their authorized strength.

2. Early-deploying Reserve component units will have no source for trained individuals to fill out their seriously under-strength units.

3. Units in the combat theater will also have no source upon which to draw trained individuals to replace combat losses.

Recent studies fully indicate that the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is virtually nonexistent in terms of being able to meet any one of the actions described above.

According to the personnel strength and computation system, the required rotation base for the 8,444 MP's overseas is approximately 16,500 individuals. Civilianization in any substantial amount would adversely affect recruiting, rotation base, retention, and, of most importance, the ability to provide trained replacements.

Civilianization would adversely affect the dual mission requirement which not only requires the conduct of law enforcement mission, but also includes the conduct of combat support functions.

Another problem facing Reserve component units, especially those in the military police field, is that many of them are staffed by significant numbers of civilian police. No one knows how many of these types of personnel will drop out on mobilization.

### Conclusions

In the final analysis of evaluating civilianization of GSF MP forces, there appears to be a lack of understanding and appreciation of what MP's do. They support the community, the soldier, the dependents, and the commander. They must first be a soldier, and second, a policeman.

The conclusion is that MP positions should not be civilianized for the following reasons.

1. Cost savings, if any, are insignificant.
2. Creates a lack of flexibility on assignment rotations.
3. Creates unmanageable problems with recruiting, rotational base, and readiness.
4. Restricts reassignment and career potential.
5. Prevents reactionary capability.
6. Further reduces Reserve and Active Force capabilities.

### MILITARY POLICE STRUCTURE AT CONUS INSTALLATIONS

As a major part of this study, 42 CONUS installations were surveyed to determine what functions are performed at which installations. Twenty-two of the installations were surveyed by personal interviews, and the remainder through manpower surveys and other documents provided by DA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, and various members of Combat Developments at the US Army Military Police School. The installations surveyed are shown on Table IV. The basic purposes of the survey were to determine:

What GSF law enforcement missions are performed at installations and what is the ratio of MP's to those supported?

Other purposes were to:

Compare and evaluate redistribution of STRAF assets, and to examine organizational structure and documents.

#### Survey Findings

The military police, perhaps more than any other professional branch, operate within the constraints of clearly defined rules and regulations. However, in reviewing the organizations at each installation, questions arose as to why differences exist at installations of the same type.

The answer is:

- Different missions of major units or activities.
- Capabilities, size, and geographic orientation.
- Historical alignment of duties at individual installations.
- The requirement of continued operations at different installations.
- The installation commander's priorities.
- The style and personality of the installation commander.

It should be apparent at this point that there is no clear-cut organizational division of duties or functions, because installation operating programs are extremely complex and different at each installation. Moreover, the military police management process is further

complicated by the fact that high-level priorities and day-to-day operations converge at the installation level.

TOE 19-510H and 19-500H were found to have adequate organizational guidance for the majority of functions used at installations; however, there are some specific exceptions, primarily in the typical low-visibility tasks, such as police liaison, information agencies, animal control, game warden, hunting and fishing licensing clerks, and community relations activities. At a few installations, MP's provide wide and varied functions--from maintaining BOQ and BEQ guest house keys, to providing transportation as needed.

Where STRAF and GSF units are colocated, the GSF spaces assigned are generally inadequate to perform the installation mission. For example, 30 percent of all STRAF forces in CONUS are committed to daily law enforcement missions.

There is a wide variety of MP strength ratio to numbers supported. Example: Presidio, San Francisco, with a 1 to 11 ratio, while Fort Sill and Fort Jackson have as little as 1 to 110.

Continued emphasis on the quality of life for soldiers has placed increased burdens on MP support.

GSF forces have been reduced based on STRAF units' availability.

Area responsibility has an enormous impact on time and resources at installation law enforcement.

Police Service Programs and the support to the human dimension in the military community have increased military police requirements.



The "as required" basis for allocation in 19-510H for physical security and AWOL apprehension section provides inadequate guidance for staffing.

Cellular teams in MTOE's do not exist for some frequently performed functions such as police service functions, game warden, and animal control.

#### Redistribution of CONUS STRAF Military Police Battalions

Numerous factors impact on the law enforcement mission at CONUS installations--type of population served, criminal activity in the vicinity of installations, percentage of authorized Army strength devoted to law enforcement, physical security missions, and the stationing of division/STRAF MP forces.

The Army's classification system establishes a standard method for classifying Army Forces. The three forces categories include all units in the structure; thus, military police forces are part of three categories: (1) Category A - Division Forces; (2) Category B - Special Mission Forces; (3) Category C - General Support Forces (GSF). Division forces include Army divisions and all units which directly support, or are planned to support, their operations up through and including theater Army. The STRAF MP battalions and division MP companies are part of division forces and their strength is based on mission. Special mission forces include units specifically provided to satisfy requirements other than direct support of Army divisions. MP units under special missions are assigned primarily by type mission. General support forces include units which provide

administrative and logistical support for the forces in Categories A and B. Included are training, logistics, and other support activities of CONUS.

Force structuring is fundamentally mission oriented, with recognized basis of allocations being employed to the maximum extent to construct a given force.

The law enforcement career group, as of 31 December 1972, constituted 3.3 percent authorization of the total Army Force (DCSPER Report 46). 1977 MP strength figures totalled 3 percent of the total force. (Information provided by LED DCSPER.)

The military police baseline force structure studies conducted during 1972-74 resulted in relocation of STRAF MP battalions and company assets designed to increase law enforcement at installation levels.

With the inactivation of three STRAF MP companies during FY 78, and the potential for further reductions in GSF, thereby increasing the borrowed manpower from STRAF units, a reevaluation of MP requirements at CONUS installations is required.

Two STRAF MP battalions are located at Fort Hood and Fort Bragg. Each provides approximately 25 percent of its STRAF force on a daily basis to the installation law enforcement mission. All are part of the mobilization plans and have important contingency missions.

Four other STRAF battalions are located with headquarters in Fort Meade, Fort Dix, Fort Riley, and Presidio of San Francisco. Each has a company located at another installation--Fort Riley at

Fort Bliss, Fort Meade at Fort Belvoir, Fort Dix at Fort Lee. Fort Dix, Fort Riley, and Presidio of San Francisco all will lose one company each in FY 78 as a result of the recommendation made in the 78-82 POM.

Total military and civilian employees stationed at Presidio number approximately 4,800. The MP strength at Presidio is approximately 408 as of April 1978, or a 1 to 11 ratio. With the one-unit reduction scheduled during FY 78, the ratio remains at approximately 1 to 28.

Fort Belvoir has a law enforcement command with a 1 to 20 ratio and a small area responsibility.

Both Fort Jackson and Fort Sill are above a 1 to 100 ratio-- Fort Jackson with 110 MP's assigned and 16,800 personnel supported, and Fort Sill with 168 MP's and over 24,000 personnel supported.

Recommend:

1. The battalion headquarters and the remaining STRAF company at Presidio be moved to Fort Sill to form a law enforcement activity.
2. The STRAF unit at Fort Belvoir move to Fort Jackson to form a law enforcement activity.
3. Presidio and Fort Belvoir organize MP support under GSF structure.
4. Fort Ord form a law enforcement command activity and assume responsibility for Presidio law enforcement and area of responsibility.

### Police Service Approach

The Police Service Approach is a new program which was established by the Department of the Army's approval of a plan to elevate organizational professionalism in law enforcement (PEOPLE) which outlined doctrinal and training shortfalls identified by a worldwide assessment of military police activities. The need was reemphasized in a memorandum to the Director of the Army Staff from the Honorable Robert L. Nelson, Assistant Secretary of the Army. The Assistant Secretary expressed concern over the level and scope of training in the areas of crises intervention and the use of force.

The Police Service Approach is designed to make military police more skilled at policing the human dimension of a military community. The total program is presently in the development stage at the United States Army Military Police School and Training Center at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Its development was driven by several forces. First, increases in what is called the new crimes package: juvenile delinquency, alcohol and drug abuse, rape and sexual assaults, child abuse and neglect, domestic family problems, and terrorism. None are new, but what is new is the frequency in which they now occur on military installations. Second is the worldwide assessment of military police effectiveness, where these areas are identified, as having training and/or doctrinal deficiencies.

Under the Police Service Approach, current military police will be provided additional training in the following areas: child abuse



and neglect, community relations, investigations, crime detection, crime prevention, crises intervention, juvenile delinquency, fish and wildlife management, and drug and alcohol abuse. Thereby, simultaneously reorienting our approach to garrison law enforcement support to one of controlling, regulating, and providing assistance in human behavior matters.

A part of the Police Service Approach will be to provide the commander assistance in referring soldiers and dependents to the support activity best suited.

The key individual in this program is the police service specialist (the E-6 platoon supervisor trained as a specialist in behavioral science techniques and awarded an additional skill identifier (ASI). He will be trained to handle crises intervention situations such as attempted suicides, domestic disturbances, and dealing with terrorists holding a hostage. A process, as opposed to a produce approach, in handling people.

Implementation of this program is progressing smoothly. On 3 October 1978, a request for designated ASI's for military police was forwarded to TRADOC to include SQT-type tests and changes to soldiers' manuals. In November, TRADOC forwarded the request, recommending approval.

Three separate training packages have been developed and delivered to TEC contractors for final print. The Training Development Institute is providing funds for consultants for development of the resident phases of training.



Conclusion: A survey of the various jobs and functions actually performed at CONUS installations includes all of the new crimes mentioned above. Their frequency and the attention provided vary with the approaches taken by the provost marshal. Although not specifically identified or even uniform in what section provides the support, military police do provide assistance in each area.

There is a need for doctrinal development in the Police Service Approach.

There is a need for additional training.

The military police are the in-house agency to perform this type human service mission in support of the Army's total goals.

#### Law Enforcement Command Concept

This is a concept where a single manager for a law enforcement activity is established. It is designed to eliminate the fragmentation of our combat support and general support missions. Many installations have both STRAF and GSF MP assets.

1. Manpower survey teams, since 1973, have counted military police (MOS 95B) from colocated STRAF MP units against the requirements of installation (GSF) MP company as other personnel. The results have been an overall reduction in resources.

2. The garrison provost marshal has been placed in a position of having all the responsibility for law enforcement with most of his assets commanded by another person charged with feeding, housing, and training, and with little interest in law enforcement.

It became apparent that there was a need for a single manager for all military police activities.

FORSCOM proposed a concept that would establish a command and control headquarters to manage all law enforcement assets as defined by AR 10-10 and DA POM 570-551. The goal of the structure was to provide efficient, integrated directions where GSF and STRAF military police units are colocated.

Under this concept, all MP assets (STRAF and GSF) would be consolidated under one commander who would also be the provost marshal.

A concept plan was forwarded to Headquarters Department of the Army on 29 December 1975--approved in concept on 3 March 1976. Headquarters Department of the Army directed a test be conducted in coordination with TRADOC.

The test was conducted during the period of February to August 1976.

As a result of the test, the following recommendations were made:

- That a military police law enforcement activity concept providing a single manager for military police law enforcement assets at installations, activities, or area levels be approved, and that appropriate doctrine be revised to include this concept.

- That TOE 19-500H be changed to incorporate command teams to provide the structure for military police law enforcement activities.

- That installation commanders be given the option to organize military police assets depending on local conditions.

-- That AR 10-10 clearly permit flexibility in the placement of the provost marshal in organizational structures, and that other directives be modified accordingly.

As a result of a survey conducted of installation provost marshals in support of this study, the law enforcement activity concept was found to have enthusiastic support.

It was concluded that the concept provided more flexibility and effective management of resources resulting in better programs and training.

It should be pointed out that all additional spaces are provided in-house, which creates a danger in possible future reductions.

The general conclusions are:

-- A single manager concept results in improved management of resources and more effective control of assets.

-- The consolidation under a single manager promotes more efficient law enforcement and crime prevention.

-- The unification of responsibility for garrison law enforcement and combat readiness enhances the readiness of assigned STRAF military police units.

Recommendations: Establish at all installations where STRAF and GSF forces exist.

#### TOE Versus TDA

The military police have two applicable cellular TOE documents--  
TOE 19-510H, "MP and MP Teams," and MTOE 19-500H, "MP Command and Control Teams." AR 310-31, "Management Systems for Table of

Organization and Equipment (TOE)," describes the cellular TOE concept as providing organizational structure designed for specific missions, functions, and activities, and provides flexible organizational guides to field commanders for structuring units to meet nonstandard requirements.

AR 310-49 establishes the priorities for organizing units under MTOE as opposed to TDA. It further emphasizes that MTOE and TDA units will not be mixed in units.

FORSCOM recently recommended that all GSF TOE military police companies be reorganized into TDA units. Department of the Army disapproved the request basically on a general policy which states reorganization will occur when there is:

1. A realignment to perform the same mission at reduced cost in funding manpower or management.
2. A realignment to improve the capabilities of a unit at no increase in cost funding, manpower, or equipment.
3. A realignment to accommodate increased missions and provide additional capabilities that are tangible and cost effective.

Other considerations are:

- TDA authorizations are based primarily on Staffing Guides found to be normally out-of-date and ignored by installations.
- TDA's have received more reductions than MTOE's. Example: recent cut in training.
- TDA's cause limitations on station-of-choice enlistments.
- TOE organizations can be deployed.

-- TOE grade structure is more compatible for law enforcement mission.

-- TOE provides cellular capabilities to maintain equipment standards.

-- TOE's are supported by doctrine/TRADOC.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

1. Do not convert military police GSF spaces to civilian and/or contractor.

2. TOE 19-510H be designed to include cellular teams for Law Enforcement Command, Police Service Programs, game wardens and animal control.

3. Establish Law Enforcement Commands at all installations where STRAF and GSF military police forces are colocated.

4. Continue to develop Police Service Programs.

5. Redistribute STRAF forces as recommended.

6. Do not convert GSF forces to TDA spaces.



### CHAPTER III

#### FOOTNOTES

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TABLE I

CRIME TRENDS - CONUS

RATE PER 1000 SOLDIERS

CY	QTR	AWOL	DFR	CRIMES VIOLENCE	CRIMES PROPERTY	MARIHUANA USE/POSS	DRUGS
73	1	55.8	18.0	1.55	17.12	4.64	1.28
	2	53.9	20.7	1.63	19.22	5.26	1.17
	3	54.5	19.7	1.69	22.65	4.73	1.07
	4	36.6	12.0	1.69	20.76	5.61	1.04
75	1	29.0	7.4	1.85	20.85	8.08	1.27
	2	24.8	6.7	1.69	21.41	7.06	1.22
	3	23.6	6.6	1.84	22.19	5.12	.99
	4	16.1	4.8	1.52	21.87	6.19	1.05
77	1	12.5	3.3	1.24	18.68	8.53	1.16
	2	17.3	4.3	1.24	19.73	7.42	.96
	3	19.4	5.1	1.50	22.45	7.26	.90
	4	13.3	3.7	1.23	20.60	6.54	.72

TABLE II

CRIMES OF VIOLENCEPERCENT OF TOTAL OFFENSES  
BY TYPECONUS CY AVERAGES

	<u>CY 73</u>	<u>CY 75</u>	<u>CY 77</u>
Murder	5	5	4
Rape	7	9	12.5
Robbery	48	44	32
Aggravated Assault	40	42	51.5
			%

TABLE III

COMPENSATION-RELATED COSTS

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>					<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>PAY</u>	<u>INCOME TAX</u>	<u>BAQ</u>	<u>RETIREMENT</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>	
E-3	6,900	490	1200	2100	1300	12,000
E-4	7,600	580	1400	2300	1500	13,300
E-5	8,700	670	1800	2700	1600	15,000
<u>GRADE</u>	<u>CIVILIANS</u>					<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>PAY</u>	<u>OVERTIME</u>	<u>INSURANCE</u>	<u>RETIREMENT</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>	
GS-3	8,050	125	35	2000	970	11,200
GS-4	9,400	150	40	2300	850	12,700
GS-5	10,700	200	50	3000	750	14,300

Source: Office of ASD (Comptroller)

<u>PIPELINE COSTS</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>MILITARY GRADE</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>TRAVEL</u>	<u>OTHER COSTS</u>	
3	1100	10	550	1,700
4	1350	240	600	2,190
5	1350	210	700	2,260



TABLE III (CONTINUED)

COMPENSATION RELATED COSTS

PIPELINE COSTS

<u>CIVILIAN GRADE</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>TRAVEL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3	90	10	100
4	130	70	200
5	260	150	410

Source: DOD Military Manpower Training Report FY 78  
US Civil Service Commission Employee Training 1977 Data

SUPPORT COSTS

CIVILIAN

GS-3 60  
GS-4 70  
GS-5 110

MILITARY

E-3 820  
E-4 1000  
E-5 1230

TABLE IV  
INSTALLATIONS SURVEYED

1. Aberdeen Proving Ground		
523 MP Service Company		19-500H
2. Carlisle Barracks		
233 MP Detachment		19-500H
3. Fort Benning		
139 MP Company		19-500H
988 MP Company		19-77H
4. Fort Bliss		
591 MP Company		19-500H
978 MP Company		19-77H
5. Fort Belvoir		
437 MP Company		19-77H
521 MP Company		19-500H
6. Fort Bragg		
503 MP Battalion		19-76H
58 MP Company		19-500H
82 MP Company		19-67H
7. Fort Campbell		
101 MP Company		19-087H
553 MP Company		19-500H
8. Fort Carson		
4 MP Company		19-27H
984 MP Company		19-77H
19 MP Company		19-500H
9. Fort Devens		
624 MP Company		19-500H

TABLE IV (CONTINUED)

INSTALLATIONS SURVEYED

10. Fort Dix	
759 MP Battalion	19-076H
412 MP Company	19-77H
511 MP Company	19-77H
532 MP Company	19-500H
11. Fort Drum	
68 MP Detachment	19-510H
12. Fort Gordon	
140 MP Company	19-500H
13. Fort Hamilton	
563 MP Company	19-500H
14. Fort Benjamin Harrison	
226 MP Company	19-500H
15. Fort Hood	
545 MP Company	19-027H
720 MP Battalion	19-076H
89 MP Corps	19-272H
401 MP Company	19-077H
410 MP Company	19-077H
411 MP Company	19-077H
16. Fort Huachica	
512 MP Company	19-500H
17. Fort Indiantown Gap	
225 MP Detachment	19-510H
18. Fort Jackson	
138 MP Company	19-500H

TABLE IV (CONTINUED)

INSTALLATIONS SURVEYED

19. Fort Knox	
543 MP Company	19-500H
20. Fort Leonard Wood	
463 Escort Guard	19-047H
208 MP Company Service	19-500H
21. Fort Lee	
555 MP Company	19-077H
515 MP Company	19-500H
22. Fort Lewis	
9 MP Company	19-027H
296 MP Company	19-500H
14 MP Company	19-530H
23. Fort Leavenworth	
205 MP Company	19-500H
24. Fort McClellan	
111 MP Company	19-500H
25. Fort McPherson	
525 MP Company	19-500H
26. Fort Meade	
519 MP Battalion	19-076H
241 MP Company	19-500H
27. Fort Monroe	
560 MP Company	19-500H
28. Fort Myer	
561 MP Company	19-500H

## TABLE IV (CONTINUED)

INSTALLATIONS SURVEYED

29. Fort Ord	
7 MP Company	19-027H
571 MP Company	19-077H
54 MP Company	19-500H
30. Fort Polk	
5 MP Company	19-027H
258 MP Company	19-077H
551 MP Company	19-500H
31. Fort Riley	
1 MP Company	19-027H
716 MP Battalion	19-076H
890 MP Company	19-077H
977 MP Company	19-077H
207 MP Company	19-510H
32. Fort Ritchie	
572 MP Company	19-097
33. Fort Rucker	
141 MP Company	19-500H
34. Fort Sam Houston	
52 MP Company	19-500H
35. Fort Sheridan	
204 MP Company	19-500H
36. Fort Sill	
197 MP Detachment	19-510H
546 MP Company	19-500H
37. Fort Stewart	
24 MP Company	19-027H
298 MP Company	19-500H



TABLE IV (CONTINUED)

INSTALLATIONS SURVEYED

38.	Presidio of San Francisco	
	504 MP Battalion	19-076
	163 MP Detachment	19-510H
39.	Redstone Arsenal	
	291 MP Company	19-500H
40.	US Military Academy	
	57th MP Company	19-077H
41.	White Sands	
	37th MP Company	19-500H
42.	Fort McCoy	19-510H

## CHAPTER IV

### MILITARY POLICE MOBILIZATION PLANNING

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss military police mobilization planning. This is done by discussing some of the major issues affecting mobilization planning and in developing a method for determining post-mobilization military police support at those installations where mobilization is to be accomplished.

#### MAJOR ISSUES

Many studies and papers have been written which discuss the general overall problems of mobilization in this country. Others have discussed mobilization problems in the Army, but few, if any, address some of the basic problems affecting the planning behind the mobilization of military police resources. The basic issue for military police mobilization is to insure that, when mobilization occurs, there are adequate numbers of appropriately organized military police units which can be ready at the right time to provide for the performance of those functions discussed in chapter II, both in support of the total force being mobilized in CONUS, and the force involved in a conflict overseas.

The two most important precepts that guide military police mobilization planning are that the force structure must be designed-- first, to support the military police requirements for Europe (OPLAN 4102M); and second, to provide for adequate military police support at CONUS mobilization stations. Mobilization force structuring in

terms of specifically allocating separate military police units for other contingencies in addition to those above, is generally not done. All of this, of course, is in line with the overall Europe-oriented thrust of all Army mobilization planning. The required military police support for the Europe-oriented force (OPLAN 4102M) is determined by a statement of requirements from USAREUR which were developed primarily by the USAREUR Provost Marshal's Office. The post-mobilization requirements for military police support at CONUS installations are developed at FORSCOM. They are developed from a combination of information from installation commanders and installation provost marshals, with assistance from the FORSCOM Provost Marshal's Office. The total force requirements are determined at DA by combining the post-mobilization requirements for installations, the support required for Europe, and the support required for any other non-Europe-oriented contingency force. Based on several factors, the Active Army and Reserve component mix is determined, and the result is a total Army troop list. Once the troop list is completed, Active and Reserve component forces are organized where units of a certain type do not exist. Some units are reorganized in cases where they are no longer required. If possible, they are reorganized into a type unit that is required. This process, when taken at face value, would appear to be reasonable and responsive to the actual needs of the Army. Unfortunately, several aspects of the system make it very difficult for working level planners to feel comfortable that the necessary fighting force will be ready at the appointed time and place to

carry out the assigned tasks. Included below are two of the most significant issues and disconnects that affect the planning process. Parts of each issue have possible solutions, while the remaining parts require perseverance and great understanding by military police force planners.

#### Lack of Consistency

Over the last few years, the military police force planning actions in support of OPLAN 4102M have not been as consistent as they possibly could have been. In some instances, the forces developed appeared to vary significantly from that which would be necessary and in accordance with doctrine. Military police force planners seemed to be at the mercy of higher level planners who either could not be convinced of the real military police force requirements or did not care what the real requirements were and developed military police forces based on what appeared to be unrealistic strength restrictions and other constraints that did not recognize the seriousness of the assumptions and shortfalls. Consequently, significant doctrinal disconnects and shortfalls between what the 4102 planners requested and what the FORSCOM and DA level planners considered as basic requirements for any force of the size to be supported were identified. Much of this can probably be attributed to an inability or unwillingness of force planners to structure forces based on the latest doctrine developed through the combat development process. Add to this the constant changing of personalities on the part of military police commanders and force planners, and a situation

emerges which has caused traumatic changes, sometimes on a yearly basis, in the military police force structure. This problem of ever-increasing and decreasing requirements when magnified through the staffing process at FORSCOM and DA causes a great deal of uncertainty on the part of these higher level planners. This is particularly true for the Reserve component force structure planner who must structure the Reserve components to meet the ever-changing requirements. The problem becomes even more serious when considering the time-phasing of the planning process.

#### Time-Phasing of Requirement Planning

The actual time it takes to proceed from the stated new requirement from Europe to the actual availability of the deployable unit in the force structure could be as much as 4 years, but never less than 2 years. Since the requirements are stated yearly, it is quite possible that significant force structure actions still in the planning or beginning implementation stage at the FORSCOM and DA level can be overtaken by new or completely opposite requirements in a new request from Europe. To keep this turbulence at a manageable level, the changes required by European planners should be relatively consistent, and only those necessary to fine tune a capability or to make a quantum increase in capability. If this is done, the follow-through by DA and FORSCOM can be logical and smooth, and the time-phasing problem will not, in itself, create problems. The most traumatic "knee-jerk" problem develops when during one year's submission there is a significant reduction or change in numbers and



types of units, and during the next year's request the same type units are increased in number. When this type action occurs, the Reserve component force planner is required to delete excess forces from the troop list. He either inactivates the excess units or redesignates them to fill other increases in requirements. When the next year's request increases the number of the units, the process is reversed. Sometimes the action on the initial change has been accomplished and new units have to be activated. The same kind of turbulence occurs whenever there are changes in the date that units are required in Europe. When Active Army STRAF units have their required in-country date slipped past the date that requires that a particular unit be in the Active structure, the unit is either inactivated or placed in a Reserve component. If during the next cycle the date is moved forward again, the process is reversed. These kinds of changes have occurred in recent years, and, consequently, military police force structuring has been difficult and seemingly unresponsive. The most serious problem, of course, is that the necessary force structure to meet the needs for combat will always be in a state of change and ultimately may not be available at the time required. Military police force planners must constantly be aware of these problems and do everything within their power to be consistent in stating requirements and to take into account the full impact of the time-phasing of their force planning efforts.

## DETERMINING POST-MOBILIZATION MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

During the conduct of the research for this part of the study, and during the interviewing of several personnel concerned with mobilization force planning, it became very clear that a systematic method for determining post-mobilization military police support requirements did not exist. Two primary actions are required to do this. First, reasonable requirement criteria must be developed for determining how much and what kind of military police support is necessary. Second, a step-by-step method for applying these criteria to each mobilization installation in developing the actual support requirements is necessary.

### Basic Conditions

The following basic conditions have been selected as reasonable guidelines for developing how much and what type of military police support will be required.

Responsibilities. The responsibility for accomplishing the presently assigned functions and tasks of existing military police elements will continue into and throughout mobilization. The very nature of mobilization, of course, will cause some changes in priorities and emphasis.

Reinitiation of functions. Many functions that have been eliminated over the years because of resource constraints and the very nature of peacetime law enforcement will have to be reinitiated.

1. Confinement facilities that have been closed over the years because of a large decrease in prisoner population will have to be reopened. Others that have been reduced in operating capacity will have to be increased to full capacity. Full capacity is used rather than mobilization capacity, as being more realistic for planning purposes. Mobilization capacity can be built up to as the mobilization buildup occurs.

2. Armed Forces police detachments or something similar will have to be employed in large cities and at large transportation terminals for the purpose of assisting military personnel and maintaining liaison with local police agencies.

3. Military police physical security units will have to be troop listed for employment at major ports and civilian air terminals where military supplies and equipment will be staged for overseas shipment. The small civilian guard forces presently employed at these locations will not be able to handle the magnitude of the security requirements associated with placing a wartime logistics system into operation.

Increase in present capability. The level of military police support at virtually all mobilization installations will have to be increased. This will not be necessary at some installations where the increase in population or other requirements are small. The existing military police unit will have to absorb the requirement. Determining the actual amount of the increase is the most difficult aspect of this situation. Ideally, the increase should be directly

relatable to actual numbers and types of specific requirements; i.e., number of new patrols and posts and other associated supervisory increases. However, because of the postulated nature of what will happen during mobilization, this is not feasible and could not be realistically accomplished. Another reasonable technique is to increase the required military police strength at any given installation at the same percentage as experienced with the population. Add to this increase any personnel required to accomplish new or reinitiated tasks not performed during peacetime, and the necessary military police support can be provided. Some of the more significant reasons that this increase is necessary are as follows:

1. There will be an overall increase in the density of the population throughout the installation, which will aggravate the atmosphere for conflict. The vehicular density increase over the same amount of road space will also intensify the possibility of conflict.

2. Security problems will increase with the opening up of old and insecure billet areas and the construction of large tent cities.

3. AWOL apprehension efforts will be increased as a result of mobilization. The magnitude of this problem may surpass anything known in the past. This will be because of recent governmental policies relating to the handling of Vietnam-era deserters.

4. The increase of the soldier population in the local civilian community will require the increased employment of off-post



patrols and the conduct of full-time liaison activities with the local police agencies.

5. Significant increases in convoy escort activities in and around the installation and from the installation to port facilities for overseas shipment of vehicles will be required.

6. If military prisoners must be escorted to another installation, an increase in personnel to accomplish the escorting will be required.

#### Method for Determining Military Police Post-Mobilization Support Requirements

The method used herein is the flow chart decision model approach. It insures that each support consideration is systematically applied to all installations. Chronologically, it requires the gathering of certain basic information, the performing of mathematical functions, and the application of allocation criteria based on the gathered data.

#### Information Gathering

The following basic information about each mobilization installation must be obtained prior to using the model. For ease in working the model, the information is recorded on the information sheet shown at figure 4-1, and discussed below. The mobilization force planner should prepare a message to each installation for the purpose of gathering any information that is not available in onhand planning documents. Listed below are some of those items required:



1. The present installation peacetime strength. This should include the civilian strength and the assigned military strength.

2. The planned mobilization strength by month.

3. Determine whether or not a provost marshal section exists.

4. The required and authorized strengths of the assigned GSF military police unit. Include only the military police officers and enlisted men, MOS 31A and 95B, respectively.

5. The authorized strength of any STRAF military police units stationed on the installation. Include the type unit by TOE, and the strength of the military police officers and enlisted men, MOS 31A and 95B, respectively.

6. The scheduled deployment dates of the STRAF military police units.

7. Ascertain if there is a confinement facility on the installation and whether or not it is operating. If it is operating, determine the present capacity and the strength of the cadre. Next, determine the full capacity and the cadre required to operate it at that level. If it is not operating, determine if it can be operational in 90 days. If there is not a facility on the installation, determine if there is another military facility within 150 miles. If there is not a facility within 150 miles, determine if there is a local civilian confinement facility which will house military prisoners. If a local civilian facility exists which will house military prisoners, determine how many they can house.

### Worksheets

The following worksheets will assist force planners in recording the necessary information for determining the numbers and types of units required.

Information Sheet (Figure 4-1). The following Information Sheet is designed to provide the necessary basic information for working through the decision model and making the computations necessary to actually determine the magnitude of the increased support requirements. All of the information required to complete this worksheet is available from existing strength documents, from mobilization deployment lists, and from the installation itself. The reason for and the use of the data is explained below:

1. Item 1. This is the base strength from which the percentage of military police strength is computed. It is used in item 1 of figure 4-2. In those instances where an inactive installation is being mobilized, use the mobilization strength to be reached at M+030.

2. Item 2. This information is required to determine the latest date that a post-mobilization support unit can be mobilized. It is also used to determine the answer in the following item.

3. Item 3. This figure is used to compute several other figures. It is part of the calculations for the minimum military police strength to support mobilization (item 2, figure 4-2) and for determining what the average prisoner population will be in the confinement facility.

# INFORMATION SHEET

Installation: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Present Installation Peacetime Strength: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Planned mobilization by month: \_\_\_\_\_

M+030	M+060	M+090	M+120	M+150	M+180
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

3. Average Mobilization Population: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Average of three highest months from item 2 above)

4. Does a Provost Marshal Section Exist? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

5. Strength of GSF  
MP Unit:  
a. Required Strength

OFF 31A	EM 95B	TOTAL

b. Authorized Strength

6. Strength and Type of MP STRAF Units Located on Post:

Unit designation	TOE	Authorized Strength			Number available for GSF spt, 25% of MP spaces
		OFF	EM	TOTAL	

7. MP STRAF Unit Deployment Schedule:

Unit designation	M+030	M+060	M+090	M+120	M+150	M+180

8. Is a Confinement Facility Available? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

a. Is it operational? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_.

(1) Present Capacity \_\_\_\_\_ Cadre Auth Str \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Full Capacity \_\_\_\_\_ Cadre Auth Str \_\_\_\_\_

b.. If not operational, can it be in 90 days? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

c. Is there a military conf fac within 150 miles? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

d. Is there a civilian confinement available? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

What is the Capacity Available for Military Use? \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 4-1

4. Item 4. This information is used to determine if a unit is required to act as the installation provost marshal.

5. Item 5. These strength figures are used to determine, along with the information in item 1, the military police percentage of the total strength. It also indicates the number of personnel required to bring the GSF military police unit strength from the authorized to the required level. In those instances where an inactive installation is being mobilized, select the military police strength of an active installation with a similar troop population as that determined in item 1 above.

6. Item 6. This information is required to determine the availability of STRAF units to provide installation support.

7. Item 7. This information is required to assist in determining when Reserve component units must be mobilized and on station before the STRAF assets, if any, are deployed.

8. Item 8. This information is required to assist in determining how many prisoners will be confined and how many personnel it will take to operate the confinement facility.

Computation Worksheet (Figure 4-2). This worksheet assists planners in developing the definitive numbers of personnel required to provide the necessary level of support. Most of the items are somewhat self-explanatory in that they use data from the Information Sheet discussed above. The reason for the data, and an explanation of some computations, are included below:

# COMPUTATION WORKSHEET

Installation: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Present MP percentage =  $\frac{\text{GSF MP init req str}}{\text{Inst peacetime str}}$
2. Min MP str for mob = Present MP percentage  $\times$  Avg Mob str of install
3. Strength of unit for provost marshal/command and control: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Requirements for new or increased missions:

Missions	No. of MP Pers	Remarks
Offpost activities		
AWOL apprehension		
Convoy escort		
Prisoner escort		
Total:		

5. Requirements for Law Enforcement activities:
  - a. Minimum MP strength required for mobilization(item 2): \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. MP requirements for new or increased missions(item 4): \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Total law enforcement requirements( add a + b): \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. Deduct present authorized MP strength(fig 4-1): \_\_\_\_\_
  - e. Total new strength requirements for law enforcement: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Requirements for confinement activities:
  - a. Strength required to bring ICF to full capacity:  
(See item 8a, fig 4-1) \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Strength required to staff a reopened or temporary facility: (See item 8a(2) and 8b. fig 4-1) \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Number of liaison personnel required when using a local civilian facility: (See Decision 2D, fig 4-4) \_\_\_\_\_
7. Total military police requirements:
  - a. Provost marshal/command and control: (item 3) \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Law enforcement:(item 5e) \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Confinement: (item 6a, b, or c) \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. Total: \_\_\_\_\_

Figure 4-2



1. Item 1. This computation provides a military police percentage figure that can be extrapolated into the minimum required military police strength upon mobilization through the computations shown at item 2. To insure that there is not a shortfall in the support requirements, the force planner should apply reasonable judgement to specific situations where there is an obvious imbalance, when compared to other installations of similar size.

2. Item 3. Completing this item assists the force planner in insuring that a capability is troop listed to provide for provost marshal operations and/or command and control of two or more military police companies or detachments. A small military police battalion headquarters, team AE, TOE 19-510H, is adequate to provide this capability. Additionally, the unit can be deployed later, if a requirement arises.

3. Item 4. These requirements must be considered to insure that adequate military police resources are troop listed to accomplish new and/or increased missions that are not being performed during peacetime. As indicated before, these requirements exceed the capability of the increase calculated in item 2. Actually determining the number of personnel required to accomplish each of these or other tasks not listed will require reasonable judgemental decisions on the part of the force planner. The planner can also obtain assistance from installation provost marshals in those instances where questions arise. The requirements listed in this item have been discussed in general terms above.

### Unit Selection Criteria

The type and size of unit to be selected, of course, are directly relatable to the total increase in military police personnel either for general law enforcement activities or for confinement operations. The type, more specifically, relates, in the area of law enforcement, to the type of missions for which the increased requirement was developed--the TOE 19-77, general military police support company, for general law enforcement activities; the TOE 19-97, military police physical security company, for general physical security missions; and the TOE 19-500, Team AE, for command and control and to function as the installation provost marshal where required. For confinement operations, TOE 19-530, correctional teams, will provide the necessary personnel resources to either open and operate a new facility or to increase the operations of an already existing facility to its full capacity. Figure 4-3, Units Required Worksheet (URW), is a shopping list for planners.

### Decision Model

The decision model shown on the following pages is a flow chart designed to assist post-mobilization military police force planners in developing the necessary support for each mobilization installation. It is a step-by-step flow chart that considers most of the major support requirements that will develop during mobilization. Other problems peculiar to individual installations will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Using the data developed through the Information Sheet (Figure 4-1) and the Computation Worksheet

# UNITS REQUIRED WORKSHEET (URW)

1. Law Enforcement. The information provided below allows for an incremental increase in military police units using platoon-size building blocks. A command and control team is indicated when the increase goes up to two additional companies. This takes into account that a GSF MP company already exists.

<u>MP strength increase required (item 5, fig. 4-2)</u>	<u>TOE 19-77H ( ) MP Off &amp; EM Str</u>
0 to 50	1 Platoon (49)
51 to 110	1 Co HQ & 2 platoons (103)
111 to 160	1 Company (152)
161 to 210	1 Company + 1 platoon (201)
211 to 260	1 Co, 1 co HQ & 2 platoons (255)
261 to 310	2 Companies (304)
	1 Bn HQ, Team AE TOE 19-500
311 to 360	2 Companies + 1 platoon (353)
	1 Bn HQ, Team AE
361 to 410	2 Co, 1 co HQ & 2 platoons (404)
	1 Bn HQ, Team AE
411 to 460	3 Companies (456)
	1 Bn HQ, Team AE

2. Physical Security. One Physical Security Company, TOE 19-97, is normally allocated for each major port or storage facility.

## 3. Confinement Operations.

a. The information listed below is developed primarily for the purpose of having a notionalized unit available to open a closed facility or to establish a temporary facility. It is based on developing the staffing required for an average facility. Peculiarities of a given facility, if known, should be considered in the final requirement determination.

<u>Capacity of Facility</u>	<u>TOE 19-530H</u>
50 Prisoners	Admin Overhead 1 Team HA 16
	Shift Corr Supv 1 Team HE 4
	Corr Supv 4 Team HF 16
	Pris Empl Supv 20 Team HG <u>20</u> (1)
	56

Figure 4-3

UNITS REQUIRED WORKSHEET (URW) (CONTINUED)

<u>Capacity of Facility</u>	<u>TOE 19-530H</u>			
150 Prisoners	Admin Overhead	1 Team HB	31	
	Shift Corr Supv	1 Team HE	4	
	Corr Supv	4 Team HF	16	
	Pris Empl Supv	37 Team HG	37	(2)
			88	
250 Prisoners	Admin Overhead	1 Team HC	43	
	Shift Corr Supv	1 Team HE	4	
	Corr Supv	5 Team HF	20	
	Pris Empl Supv	56 Team HG	56	(3)
			123	
400 Prisoners	Admin Overhead	1 Team HD	60	
	Shift Corr Supv	1 Team HE	4	
	Corr Supv	6 Team HF	24	
	Pris Empl Supv	84 Team HG	84	(4)
			172	

Notes: (1) Based on 4 towers (3 gds each) and 8 Pris Empl Supv.  
 (2) Based on 4 towers and 25 Pris Empl Supv.  
 (3) Based on 5 towers and 41 Pris Empl Supv.  
 (4) Based on 6 towers and 66 Pris Empl Supv.

b. The information below is provided to assist the planner in selecting the appropriate teams from TOE 19-530H required to increase the capacity of an operating facility to another required level or to its rated full capacity. The selection of the appropriate teams is very dependent on the actual structure of the cadre presently operating the facility.

(1) Administrative overhead considerations. The most significant consideration in this area is to insure that the team is large enough to handle the anticipated average prisoner population. It is important that the appropriate grade structure is allocated to insure adequate supervision of the remaining cadre. For example, if the anticipated prisoner population is expected to increase the population from 50 to 250, a Team HC should be allocated.

(2) Supervisory team considerations. If a facility is already in operation, the requirement to increase middle supervisory teams is normally not required, except when outside work details are of sufficient numbers to require middle level supervision. This usually is required at the larger capacity facilities, as indicated for the 250 and 400 prisoner capacity facilities shown above. Teams

Figure 4-3 (Continued)

UNITS REQUIRED WORKSHEET (URW) (CONTINUED)

HF have been added in both instances. Additional teams HC, prisoner employment supervisors, should be allocated on the basis of one team per six prisoners and per guard tower post. During wartime, this requires three personnel for a 24-hour period.

(3) Other requirements. The force planner, when developing requirements for reopening an existing facility or staffing a temporary facility, must allocate the appropriate mess teams from TOE 29-500.






Figure 4-4




Figure 4-4 (con't)




Figure 4-4 (con't)

## Notes

(1) If a confinement facility is in operation, this question would be answered, yes, because the ICF cadre would be assigned to the GSF company.

(2) This question refers only to law enforcement, security, and other MP support. Confinement personnel requirements are determined at Decisions 2, 3, and 4. A yes answer to this question means that the present GSF military police unit can provide the necessary support to include any new and increased mission (see item 4, figure 4-2) and those expanded general missions caused only by the general population increase. As rule of thumb, a population increase of less than 10 percent, and any addition of new tasks that does not require more than 10 percent increase in MP strength at a given installation, could fall into this category and would not require any increase in assets.

(3) This means that all MP STRAF units that deploy prior to M+060 are not expected to provide GSF MP support except on an emergency basis.

(4) In determining the answer to this question, only consider 25 percent of the STRAF assets as being available for GSF support. This is done because the unit's primary mission upon mobilization is to prepare and train for employment in an active theater.

(5) Subtract the authorized GSF MP strength (item 5b, figure 4-1) from the total number reached at item 5 of the Computation Worksheet (Figure 4-2) to find the strength increase necessary to provide the required support, go to item 1, figure 4-3, and select appropriate unit(s) to meet the requirement.

(6) Record required units on Installation Requirements Worksheet (IRW), Figure 4-5, go to Information Worksheet, Figure 4-1 and determine when the initial significant increase in population will occur from item 2, subtract 10 days, unless it is during M+1, and determine the required operational date (ROD), subtract another 10 days for travel from home location to the installation and to prepare to become operational and determine the required mobilization date (RMD). For example, if the initial significant increase occurs during M+030 to M+060, the required mobilization date (RMD) would be M+010 with a required operational date (ROD) of M+020. If the significant increase occurs during the first 30 days, during M+1, the RMD would be M+001 with the ROD not later than M+010.

(7) Same as note 5, except that the required figure here is the difference between the GSF, plus the available STRAF capability, subtracted from the total MP strength required.

Notes (Continued)

(8) There are some installations where more than one company-size STRAF unit is assigned. All of these STRAF units do not deploy simultaneously. Consequently, the assistance from STRAF elements may be withdrawn over a 2, 3, or 4-month period.






Figure 4-4 (con't)

#### Notes

- (1) Based on the planning factor of having an average of 1 percent of the installation population incarcerated. See FM 101-10-1, paragraph 5-8a.
- (2) See item 8c, figure 4-1.
- (3) See note 1 above. Go to the various worksheets on the installation that has the ICF and evaluate the ICF's full capacity versus that installation's anticipated average prisoner population and then go on to Decision 2B.
- (4) See item 8d, figure 4-1.





Figure 4-4 (con't)

#### Notes

(1) Included as a consideration because some WWII and Korean War facilities are carried as still existing, but may not be put into operation without major engineer effort. Consequently, the approach of not having a facility may be more feasible. If possible, this information could and should be determined during the information-gathering phase of the planning effort and placed in the Information Sheet at Figure 4-1 at item 8b.

(2) Based on planning factor of having an average of 1 percent of the installation's population incarcerated. See FM 101-10-1, paragraph 5-8a.

(3) Answer will surface through checking the actions taken in following Decision 2 of the model through Decisions 2A and 2B.

(4) Accomplished by subtracting the present authorized strength from the strength required to operate the facility at the required or full capacity. This done by evaluating the magnitude of the increase in terms of capacity change, the increase in the level of supervision required, and the establishment of new guard tower posts.

(5) Go to the URW, Figure 4-3, item 3b, and develop team requirements.

INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS WORKSHEET (IRW)

Installation: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Law Enforcement Requirements:

No.	Size	TOE	RMD	ROD

2. Confinement Operations: TOE 19-530H

a. Local Confinement Facility Operations:

No.	Team	RMD	ROD

b. Liaison Team for Local Civilian Confinement Facility:

No.	Team	RMD	ROD

Figure 4-5



TOTAL REQUIREMENT WORKSHEET (TRW)

[illegible]

Figure 4-6

(Figure 4-2), the force planner can enter the flow chart and ultimately determine how many Reserve component military police units of what type should be troop listed for post-mobilization support. The two worksheets discussed and shown below are used for recording the information developed as the planner goes through the decision model.

Installation Requirements Worksheet (IRW) (Figure 4-5). This worksheet provides a form to list the required units as they are developed.

Total Requirement Worksheet (TRW) (Figure 4-6). This worksheet provides a form to aggregate the total requirements for all mobilization installations.

#### SUMMARY

Military police mobilization planning has not received the necessary level of emphasis over the last few years. Much of this can be attributed to the higher priority that was, and probably should have been, given to the seemingly more critical and essential task of managing the real-time problems of daily operations. The time has come, because of the known threat and the overall increased Army-wide emphasis on better mobilization planning, to insure that those who have any responsibility for military police mobilization force planning are aware of this emphasis and capable of accomplishing the task properly. It is imperative that experienced and knowledgeable staff officers are assigned to this task. Further, it is important

that those who are involved in this type planning are consistent in developing requirements. They must be logical, reasonable, and generally in accordance with doctrine while they plan. The credibility of the Active and Reserve component military police force is at stake, if the function of mobilization planning is relegated to last priority. But more important than all of the above, the combat readiness and ultimately the success of US Forces in war could be less than optimum, if the right types of units in sufficient numbers are not available when required.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the information presented in the foregoing chapters, there is no question that the study of the three major areas of emphasis in this paper produced some interesting results. The evaluation of military police functions in chapter II certainly indicated that most of the functions presently being performed are still valid and normally support from two to four of the total Army goals. They will also be performed out through 1985 and beyond by personnel with specialized training in the areas of law enforcement, security activities, prisoner of war handling, crime investigation and prevention, corrections and confinement operations, to name a few. It is further indicated that other functions, such as counterterrorist activities and the prevention of juvenile delinquency, need more visibility and emphasis, while vehicle registration at most installations can be eliminated. Wildlife protection and animal control activities, as a pure military police function, are questionable and need to be studied in greater depth than was possible in this effort. Additionally, it became quite clear that a significant effort is required to insure that the regulatory documents which promulgate functional responsibilities are updated to eliminate confusion. The GSF force structure analysis in chapter III points out that the civilianization of military police functions needs more study, since, as a minimum, it would adversely affect readiness and the rotation base of military

police forces. The unique nature of military police duties, and the actual cost comparisons, all reinforce the staunch requirements for temperance in any civilianization question. In comparing organizations and missions at CONUS installations, it became apparent that some STRAF units should be repositioned. It was determined that TOE 19-500H and 19-510H are adequate planning documents to provide the necessary organizations for GSF military police operations. It was also determined, by analyzing the manpower survey documents, that many low-visibility tasks were actually being performed, but were not properly documented as justification for manpower spaces. The discussion of military police mobilization planning in chapter IV produced two major planning problems that face military police force planners. These are; first, that force planners must be relatively consistent in their statements of requirements during their force planning efforts; and, second, they must become fully aware of the impact of time-phasing on their individual planning actions and on the overall troop list development procedure. What may appear to be a relatively simple action at the working level may very well cause serious turbulence at the DA and FORSCOM level, with the final result being confusion in the Reserve component planning effort. This could lead to a failure of having the right units available to meet deployment and post-mobilization military police support requirements at mobilization installations.

In conclusion, the information provided in this study should be helpful to action officers and force planners who are concerned with



military police functions, with force planning efforts involving GSF and STRAF units, and with post-mobilization force planning. Finally, the authors would like to believe that their efforts in this study have provided some usable information and new perspectives which, in some small way, may help to solve future issues.

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Jackson, Donald B., LTC, Office of Provost Marshal, TRADOC, Fort Monroe.

Macolley, James, LTC, Provost Marshal, Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Valieant, John, LTC, Student, USAWC, Former Battalion Commander, Presidio of San Francisco, California.

Sanders, Rabun, LTC, Student, USAWC, Former Battalion Commander, Fort Riley.

Polk, Burley, LTC, Provost Marshal, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Knox, C. S., LTC, Mobilization/Plans Officer, MILPERSEN, Washington.

Johnstone, William, Civ., Mobilization Planning Division, DCSOPS, Washington.

Gardner, Milton, Civ., Resource and Management Division, TRADOC, Fort Monroe.

Browning, James, Civ., Human Resources Division, TRADOC, Fort Monroe.

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Patterson, Theodore B., MAJ, Office of Law Enforcement Division, DCSPER, Washington.

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Boehme, Ronald E., MAJ, Office of Provost Marshal, TRADOC, Fort Monroe.

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Turner, Philip, MAJ, Office of Provost Marshal, Fort Polk, Louisiana.



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Kerchossner, Donald B., MAJ, Fort McPherson.

Isom, Bud, CPT, Office of Provost Marshal, Presidio of San Francisco, California.

QUESTIONNAIRES AND SURVEYS

Archer, Caleb J., COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Bonner, Benjamin T., COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Riley.

Hopfenspirger, Nancy M., COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Knox.

Haydon, Christopher, Provost Marshal, Fort Gordon.

Russell, James, COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Bragg.

O'Shanghnessy, James, COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Jackson.

McCormick, Richard L., COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Ord.

Gibbons, Gerry, COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Dix.

Miller, James, COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Hood.

Weinstein, Kenneth, COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Lewis.

Kassen, Darrell D., COL, Provost Marshal, Fort Polk.

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Macolly, James, LTC, Provost Marshal, Fort Stewart.

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## APPENDIX A

### QUESTIONNAIRE AND SUMMARY COMMENTS

1. General. During the research phase of this study, it became clear that there was a significant lack of written information in several of the areas of concern. Consequently, it was decided to develop a questionnaire that would elicit thoughts, ideas, and opinions from some of the more senior and experienced military police officers in the Army. Eighteen were chosen that were currently serving as major installation provost marshals. The questionnaire was not designed to obtain any empirical data or any information that was to address any particular aspect of the study. However, the questions were restricted to addressing the general areas being researched, in an attempt to obtain additional information or to confirm some of the opinions and ideas of the authors. In some instances, new information was gained; in others, already known data was confirmed; and in a few cases, they did not respond. See the bibliography for a listing of those provost marshals to whom questionnaires were sent.

2. Summary and comments. The questionnaire, with summary comments attached at Tab A, is provided to give the reader an opportunity to know what some of the senior provost marshals of the Army think about the particular issues raised in the questionnaire. The comments are generally in summary form and are not attributed to any particular person. The reason for this is clearly stated in the cover letter that went with the questionnaire.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

IN REPLY REFER TO:

20 March 1978

We need your help. We have come to you for ideas, thoughts, and opinions to broaden our base of information for doing a study as part of our program here at the War College. We have been asked to do this by the Law Enforcement Division, DCSPER-DA, in hopes that we may be able to provide information for solving some of the sticky management problems they must address on a daily basis.

The study covers several areas of concern. The two areas listed below are those where your input will be very helpful.

a. Analyzing installation-oriented military police functions in terms of the recently published total Army goals (see incl 1).

b. Analyzing the military police force structures used to provide installation law enforcement.

The specific subject areas listed at inclosure 2 more closely define the items we are trying to address. They are not all-inclusive. We ask you to add any other information that you think would be helpful.

We are fully aware that this request asks you to spend precious time on something that certainly will not contribute to your mission, and may, in fact, detract from it. However, the few minutes necessary to record your informal handwritten comments on the attached paper (incl 2) will give us a good feel for what some of our more experienced and senior military police officers consider significant concerning the two areas of concern. We are not asking for, nor do we want, any coordinated command or installation positions. We want your comments. Please be assured that you will not be quoted in our study. We know that our corner on the idea, thought, and opinion market is very small. Hopefully, your comments and those from others like you will help us provide good problem solving information to the Law Enforcement Division.

It is our intent to go into initial draft during the first week of May. It would be helpful if your remarks arrived here at the College around the 15th of April. If you have any questions, leave a message for us to call you at Autovon 242-3810/3843. We are not at any particular telephone number on a regular basis.

Thanks for any information you may provide.

Sincerely,

2 Incl  
as

ORVILLE N. BUTTS  
Lieutenant Colonel, MPC  
Student

DONALD B. WHITMARSH  
Lieutenant Colonel, MPC  
Student



Please provide your personal comments in the following areas.

1. Mission Analysis.

a. Are there any missions presently performed by the military police that could be eliminated? (Please give your rationale. Do not include missions that could or should be performed by other than the military police.)

Summary of comments. About one-half of the responding provost marshals indicated that vehicle registration could be eliminated. Some of them have already done so and report no adverse impact on their law enforcement operations. Others point out that they have been able to do so because of their data links with the local police. AWOL apprehension was mentioned as a possibility during peacetime. Their comments seemed to be based primarily on a feeling of frustration with the system. There is a significant amount of manpower being expended to bring the AWOL soldier under military control, and then they are immediately discharged.

b. Are there any missions, normally performed by the military police, that could or should be performed by other than the military police? (Please give your rationale and indicate who should perform the mission.)

Summary of comments. Several provost marshals commented on the use of military police personnel in interior guard type security duties. They split on whether these positions should be civilianized or accomplished by other than military police personnel. They generally felt that a "highly" trained law enforcement specialist was not required for this type duty. Others strongly indicated that game warden activities and stray animal control should not be military police functions. They generally indicated that military police personnel were not trained to handle these functions, and that they should be handled by personnel with the appropriate training. The provost marshals further indicated that the supervision for these functions should fall under the veterinarian for animal control and the DFAE for game warden activities. One respondent suggested that MPI be placed under the CID.

c. Are there any logical missions either not being performed at all, or being performed by nonmilitary police personnel, that should be a mission assigned to the military police? (Please identify and give your rationale.)

Summary of comments. The operating of correctional custody facilities was mentioned by two respondents. One said that it was a logical mission for 95C personnel. Another stressed that the military police must become involved in helping to solve general community problems such as domestic disturbances, child abuse, and wife beating situations.



d. Are there any unique missions being performed by the military police at your installation that may not be considered as normal military police missions? (If you listed these missions above, please do not restate.)

Summary of comments. Mention was made in some cases of their involvement in public relations/community relations activities to the point of organizing sections to accomplish the task.

e. What is the average length of the tour of duty for your military police personnel? (Please do not include the time required for the individual to prepare for duty.)

Summary of comments. The average time seems to be somewhere between 9 and 10 hours. This usually starts with guard mount and continues through the necessary report writing. Several were careful to indicate that the daily situation controlled what really happened.

f. In the space below, or on additional pages, please provide any other function or mission-oriented comments you may consider pertinent.

Summary of comments. One provost marshal indicated a concern for the turbulence caused by the constant levying of GSF unit strength. Another commented on desiring additional guidance in countering terrorism and conducting hostage negotiations, primarily in the area of being able to obtain the appropriate equipment to carry out these functions.

## 2. Force Structure Analysis.

a. Is there a better way to organize GSF military police units to provide more efficient support to installations? (Please discuss TOE versus TDA, internal unit organizational structure, functional considerations, etc.)

Summary of comments. This question elicited comments at both extremes of the TOE versus TDA situation. On the TDA side, the comments followed the better management line with all things in one document, rather than the people on one document and the equipment on another. They also state that TOE's are not flexible enough and that TDA's are more manageable. On the TOE side, the comments were not definitive, except that they were happy--but with some reservations--and they felt that going TDA would let manpower survey teams have an easier time of making cuts. The basic reservations were that the 19-510 teams need to be made more flexible in terms of functional capabilities and grade structure. Some major functions they are performing do not have teams in the TOE. Author comment: It is quite obvious that feelings on this subject are different in as many ways as there are provost marshals.

b. In addition to your comments above, please comment specifically on the items listed below:

(1) Does the Law Enforcement Command organizational concept provide for better management of police resources? (Please indicate how.)

Summary of comments. The answer to this question was almost universally in the affirmative. Strong comments were made indicating better management, better results of AGI's, and better command and control of all MP assets. One PM pointed out that it is really only a bandage covering a myriad of doctrinal and organizational problems pertaining to installation law enforcement activities.

(2) Assuming that the present legal restrictions could be overcome, can GSF military police units be civilianized (direct hire or contract)? (Please give your rationale.)

Summary of comments. This question elicited a yes answer to the "can" aspect of the question, and a no answer in terms of "should they be civilianized." Only two PM's saw any benefits of civilianization, and those related to continuity of operations and the fact that the military police could "get on with doing the STRAF mission." On the no side of the issue, the following somewhat key comments were made:

--Estimate that one military member equates to 1.3-1.4 civilian employees.

--MP replaced on a one-to-one basis would cause a 30 to 40 percent reduction in the PM's operational capability.

--Loss of flexibility because of labor management requirements.

--Inability to conduct adequate training.

--Slower responsiveness.

--Increased difficulty in firing/replacing substandard personnel.

--Overtime funding would be extensive with budgeting being accomplished in advance.

--Civilians are more subject to RIF's, hiring freezes, etc.

--Police force certainly would no longer be "Of the troops, for the troops." Authors' note: This was pointed out by several PM's.

--Civilian policemen would have no stake in the community.

--Unions would control.

--Loss of the rotation base.

--Frustrations would be taken out on the civilian force simply because they were civilian.

(3) Are there certain military police functional areas at installation level that could be civilianized? (For example: animal control, game warden, physical security inspector, etc.)

Summary of comments. There is general agreement that wherever there are people assigned to the above functions on a permanent basis, they could be civilianized. Some concern was voiced in eroding the training base for physical security inspectors. Authors' comment: The question was somewhat loaded by suggesting the above three functions. No other functions were mentioned.

(4) What is your experience, in quantitative terms, of the instances when your military police have been required to perform duties which would be considered as overtime duty for a civilian employee? (Please provide general comments rather than specifics.)

Summary of comments. Authors' note: This question was included in an attempt to explore the problem of overtime pay requirements that might have to be paid to civilian policemen. Some of the respondents did not interpret it in that manner. From a general point of view, there are many things that are required of military policemen that would obviously be overtime duty for any civilian policeman. Some examples are: special night operations, duty carry-over for report writing, court appearances, and other callback situations. Some of the PM's estimate that their personnel work up to 20 to 30 percent overtime each week.

(5) If your military police (GSF) force was civilianized, how would you provide for their initial and inservice training?

Summary of comments. Several suggestions emerged in the answers to this question.

--Establish a civilian law enforcement academy at Fort McClellan allied with, or part of, the USAMPS.

--Contract for training with area law enforcement academies under LEAA. Conduct inservice training within the organization.

--Accomplish inservice training as part of rollcall training. Also, establish five shifts--three working, one off, and one in training.



--Require that they not be hired unless they meet the standards and qualifications of a trained police officer.

(6) In your opinion, how would the supported commanders at your installation view the civilianizing of the GSF military police support?

Summary of comments. Most respondents were very negative toward this question. They indicated that their commanders would oppose it. One said it would probably be OK, and another one stated that a well-run operation would be accepted. Another respondent indicated that acceptance would be dependent upon how it was presented, and that a massive public relations effort would be required. Most of the opposition statements were followed by comments relating to bias against civilians by soldiers, and indicating again the "Of the troops, for the troops" motto. Another respondent pointed out that the carry-over into war of the mutual trust and confidence that is established during peacetime is very important. This would not happen if the traditional military policeman becomes a civilian.

(7) Please provide any other comments you may have regarding the civilianizing of GSF military police units.

Summary of comments. Almost all respondents made additional comments about not civilianizing the GSF military police units. However, two provost marshals pointed out that it was only a matter of time before civilianization would occur.

c. Are there any problems with using STRAF elements to support GSF missions? (Please include a consideration of the impact on STRAF unit readiness.)

Summary of comments. Those who answered with comment indicated that there were problems with STRAF unit training. They immediately followed this with the point that, under the Law Enforcement Command organization, this problem can be reduced to an acceptable minimum.

d. Do your military police personnel often find themselves providing support services in areas not normally associated with law enforcement? (For example: performing family counseling and providing health care assistance.)

Summary of comments. Most respondents indicated that they did not have any missions of this type. Some harped back to the animal control and game warden problems. One indicated that in the initial stages of any emergency-type incident, regardless of its nature, the military police should and will most certainly be involved. They must, however, be quick to turn the situation over to the proper agency.

e. Are there any functional areas where labor savings can be made by substituting other means, such as anti-intrusion devices for guards, etc.?

Summary of comments. Most of the respondents commented on the problems they are having with JSIIDS. They generally felt that any new devices, such as TV monitors, traffic lights, etc., are too expensive and would not be available. One respondent indicated that greater strides could be made in word processing and other administrative actions. Another respondent expressed caution in overrating mechanical devices to replace manpower.

f. Should additional ASI be developed to support the functions of animal control, game warden, juvenile officer, etc.?

Summary of comments. This question elicited comments at both extremes. The respondents who stated "no" indicated that there are enough special skills that have already been identified, and that these areas really could be trained on an OJT basis. Those who said "yes" were in favor primarily because there were special skills that were required.

g. In the space below or on additional pages, please provide comments on the GSF force structure that you may consider pertinent.

Summary of comments. Most respondents did not have anything further to say. Comments were made in the following areas.

--There is a requirement for meaningful yardsticks for staffing MP organizations.

--When STRAF units are colocated with GSF units, the priority given to the STRAF units tends to make the GSF unit members feel like second-class citizens.

--The distribution of military police strength Armywide does not follow any plan. This includes the stationing of STRAF units.

--We must get better at articulating how the GSF military police units contribute to tactical readiness.

--We must do a better job of training our officers on the mechanics of financial management, manpower surveys, and equipment authorizations.



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